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I. Introduction
Seven decades of constitutional jurisprudence have firmly estab-
lished the right to speak in public places as among the most basic of
our political liberties.1 Since the early half of this century, that right
has been both enshrined and delimited by a body of case law balanc-
ing the tension between free expression and public order.2 Estab-
lished precedent now sanctions a complex web of permissible time,
1. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (invoking First Amendment to reverse
criminal syndicalism conviction of a defendant who had merely assisted in the conduct of a
public meeting held under the auspices of the Communist Party); Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359,361 (1931) (overturning the conviction of a Youth Communist League mem-
ber by striking down a California statute that outlawed the display of any "red flag, banner,
or badge ... [employed] as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized govern-
ment"). In the 1920s, the seeds were sown for these landmark precedents by the eloquent,
often dissenting, opinions of Justices Louis D. Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Those who won
our independence.., believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think
are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; ... that the greatest menace to freedom is
an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a funda-
mental principle of the American government."); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673
(1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (upholding criminal anarchy conviction based in part on
defendant's publication and distribution of The Left Wing Manifesto) ("It is said that this
manifesto was more than a theory, that it was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement.
It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it
or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth.... If in the long run the beliefs
expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of
the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance
and have their way.").
2. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (overturning Ku Klux Klansman's con-
viction by invoking the First and Fourteenth Amendments to strike down Ohio's criminal
syndicalism statute); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (reversing "breach
of the peace" conviction of Christian Veterans of America member who made racially
inflammatory speech) ("[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to
invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.");
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (striking down Jersey City, N.J. ordinances
requiring permits to hold public meetings and prohibiting public distribution of printed
materials) ("The privilege... to use the streets and parks for communication of views on
national questions may be regulated in the interest of all.., but it must not, in the guise of
regulation, be abridged or denied.").
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place, and manner restrictions on public speech.3 And yet, despite the
large and often subtle body of law limiting governmental power to
restrict public speech, few courts have directly addressed the seem-
ingly basic question of what restrictions may be placed on peaceful
counter-demonstration.4
The place of counter-demonstration among the pantheon of First
Amendment liberties is more than a matter of academic concern. At
the end of this century, despite predictions of an increasingly insular
and atomized American society, disputatious public controversies
continue to spill into the streets. In certain contexts, like the abortion
rights controversy, public protest has evolved into week-long and city-
wide campaigns of carefully orchestrated protests and counter-demon-
strations, often with both sides seeking simultaneous access to a
uniquely symbolic forum.5
As these protests move (like much of our commercial inter-
course) from raucous downtowns to sedate suburbs,6 protesters are
3. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Clark v. Community for Crea-
tive Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
4. Only two cases directly address First Amendment protection for counter-demon-
stration. City of Seven Hills v. Aryan Nations, No. 258726, C.P. Ct., Cuyahoga County,
Ohio (Dec. 15, 1993) (enjoining the simultaneous presence on John Demjanjuk's street of
groups of protesters-including Holocaust survivors and the Ku Klux Klan-with opposing
viewpoints on the return of "Ivan the Terrible" to the United States), affd, No. 66754, 1995
Ohio App. LEXIS 575 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1995); Olivieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602 (2d
Cir. 1986) (holding that advocates and opponents of gay rights seeking access to the same
unique forum-the sidewalk in front of St. Patrick's Cathedral-to raise their voices in
response to New York City's annual Gay Pride Parade were entitled to recognition of their
First Amendment rights and equal time for their demonstrations), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
917 (1987). These cases are discussed infra at notes 60-102 and accompanying text.
5. State by State: Both Sides Mark Roe's 21st, American Political Network, Jan. 24,
1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library; Jacqueline Frank, Groups Clash in Vocal Battle
Over Abortion Pill, Reuters, June 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUNA
File; Christine Spolar, Abortion-Rights Rally Draws Halfa Million Marchers, WASH. POST,
Apr. 6, 1992, at Al; Rhode Island: Operation Rescue and Pro-Choicers Clash, American
Political Network, Nov. 4, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library; Michael J. Ybarra &
Molly Sinclair, Abortion Protest Scurries Through City; 311 More Arrested at Clinics; Each
Side Sees Victories, WASH. PosT, Nov. 18, 1990, at Bi; Pro-Choice Advocates, Anti-Abor-
tionists Clash, Wires, Nov. 12, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; Both
Sides Demonstrate Peacefully Over Abortion, Wires, Oct. 23, 1989, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Wires File; Anti-Abortionists and Opponents Stage Moving Protests, Wires,
Aug. 12,1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; Abortion Foes, Backers Clash,
L.A. TiNms, Sept. 19, 1988, § 1, at 2.
6. See Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 68 Ohio St. 3d 221 (1994) (holding that injunc-
tion prohibiting speech activities in privately owned shopping malls was not an unconstitu-
tional restraint on speech under the Ohio State Constitution); id. at 231 (Wright, J.,
dissenting) (observing that shopping malls constitute the "'new downtowns"' and, by func-
tioning as "public-gathering centers," feature many of the qualities of our traditional public
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confronted with a growing intolerance of their presence. Some com-
munities have enacted regulations that severely restrict the right to
protest, especially in residential areas,7 while judges find themselves
confronted with the task of maintaining public order, a task often
achieved by injunctions keeping demonstrators and counter-demon-
strators apart.8
This Article argues that such restrictions are valid only as a neces-
sary expedient to prevent imminent lawless conduct, and that counter-
demonstrators otherwise have a right under established First Amend-
ment doctrine to deliver their message in the same forum, and at the
same time, as those whose message they oppose. This Article pro-
ceeds by defining counter-demonstration; examining its history, na-
ture, and significance; analyzing the few cases that have touched upon
it; and demonstrating, finally, that the right to counter-demonstration
is grounded not only in existing precedent, but in the philosophical
justifications for the First Amendment.
H. The History, Nature, and Meaning of Counter-
Demonstration
A. An Academic Definition of Counter-Demonstration
At its most basic, counter-demonstration can be defined as any
organized and affirmative act of speech, conducted in opposition to
another act of speech, that is performed in the same forum, and at the
same time, as the speech it seeks to oppose.
Counter-demonstration is something different from the right to
heckle, which is a right directly upheld already by the courts.' While
fora) (citing Note, Private Abridgment of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.
165, 168 (1980)).
7. See, e.g., Marcy Oster, Seven Hills Ban on Picketing Challenged in Court by ACLU,
CLEVELAND JEWISH NEWS, Oct. 22, 1993, at 10-11 (in anticipation of John Demjanjuk's
return there, the City of Seven Hills, Ohio, enacted a ban on all residential picketing)
[hereinafter Oster, Seven Hills Ban].
8. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994) (examining a
variety of injunctive restrictions on protests at a Florida abortion clinic, including a 36-foot
"buffer zone" surrounding the clinic in which pro-life, but not pro-choice, demonstrators
were forbidden to set foot); City of Seven Hills, No. 258726, C.P. Ct., Cuyahoga County,
Ohio. See Marcy Oster, Protests Still Restricted at Demjanjuk's Home, CLEVELAND JEWISH
NEWS, Nov. 5, 1993, at 16 [hereinafter Oster, Protests Still Restricted]; Judge Upholds Lim-
its on Protests at Demjanjuk Home, LEGAL INTELLIGENcER, Nov. 1, 1993, at 6, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, LGLINT File [hereinafter Judge Upholds Limits].
9. In re Kay, 464 P.2d 142 (Cal. 1970) (overturning criminal convictions of boycotting
farmworkers who were charged with disturbing a lawful meeting after they engaged in
rhythmical clapping and shouting for five to ten minutes during a California congressman's
speech in a city park). In Kay, the California Supreme Court observed:
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both heckling and counter-demonstration involve simultaneous
counter-speech directed at the speech or expressive activity of an-
other, with the intent to rebut, refute, or call into question the
targeted speaker's views, counter-demonstration is organized in a way
that spontaneous disruptions of another speaker are not. Moreover,
counter-demonstration involves an element of independence that
heckling, by its very nature as responsive speech, does not achieve.
Unlike the counter-demonstrator, the heckler is dependent upon the
targeted speaker if heckling is to exist at all. While the heckler's
message may be contempt for the targeted speaker or his or her point
of view, the chosen mode of expression, heckling, would be impossible
if the targeted speaker had stayed home. In this sense, counter-dem-
onstration is affirmative-it has an identity and integrity separate
from, yet dependent upon, the speech it seeks to counter.
For purposes of this Article, counter-demonstration is defined to
include not only actual or literal speech, but all of the expressive activ-
ity that comes under the broader rubric of First Amendment protec-
tion. This includes the sort of expressive activity known as "symbolic
Under most circumstances, of course, ordinary good taste and decorum would
dictate that a person addressing a meeting not be interrupted or otherwise dis-
turbed. The Constitution does not require that any person, however lofty his mo-
tives, be permitted to obstruct the convention or continuation of a meeting
without regard to the implicit customs and usage or explicit rules governing its
conduct. The constitutional guarantees of the free exercise of religious opinion,
and of the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and petition for a redress of
grievances, would be worth little if outsiders could disrupt and prevent such a
meeting in disregard of the customs and rules applicable to it. This inhibition
does not mean, however, that the state can grant to the police a "roving commis-
sion" to enforce Robert's Rules of Order, since other First Amendment interests are
likewise at stake.
Audience activities, such as heckling, interrupting, harsh questioning, and boo-
ing, even though they may be impolite and discourteous, can nonetheless advance
the goals of the First Amendment.... An unfavorable reception, such as that given
Congressman Tinney in the instant case, represents one important method by
which an officeholder's constituents can register disapproval of his conduct and
seek redress of grievances. The First Amendment contemplates a debate of im-
portant public issues; its protection can hardly be narrowed to the meeting at
which the audience must passively listen to a single point of view. The First
Amendment does not merely insure a marketplace of ideas in which there is but
one seller.
464 P.2d at 147 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Accord City of Spokane v. McDon-
ough, 485 P.2d 449 (Wash. 1971) (holding that a disorderly conduct ordinance could not be
enforced to punish an attendee at an outdoor rally who shouted "warmonger" and flashed
the peace sign at Vice President Spiro Agnew). But see State v. Hardin, 498 N.W.2d 677
(Iowa 1993) (upholding disorderly conduct conviction of heckler who intentionally dis-
rupted a speech by President George Bush during a Republican fundraising rally). See
generally Eve H. Lewin Wagner, Note, Heckling: A Protected Right or Disorderly Con-
duct?, 60 S. CAL. L. RFv. 215 (1986).
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speech,"'" provided the symbolic speech in question otherwise falls
within the parameters of counter-demonstration. For example, a
group willing to stand in silent vigil, or display placards, or wear arm-
bands as a form of expressing opposition to the views of another
group would, for purposes of this Article, be engaged in counter-dem-
onstration, provided the group engaged in its expressive conduct in
the same forum, and at the same time, as the group it sought to
oppose.
The simultaneous presence of two opposing groups is a sine qua
non of counter-demonstration, and the dynamic produced by such a
meeting is something which will be given considerable attention."
The principal focus, however, will be on efforts by the state-usually
in the form of a municipality-to limit or prohibit such encounters in
the name of peace and public safety. Such restrictions can take sev-
eral forms, all of which present similar problems from a First Amend-
ment standpoint. Legislation or the administrative regulation of
protesters-through such devices as parade permits12-are common
tools of prohibition. In other cases, cities and even states have sought
equitable relief in the courts, in efforts to enjoin those with opposing
viewpoints from meeting face-to-face. 13 In either case, the restrictions
pose the same constitutional question: To what extent, if any, and
when, may the state place constitutionally-sound limits on the act of
counter-demonstration? That query is the central question which this
Article endeavors to answer.' 4
10. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning to protest policies of
the Reagan Administration); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(wearing black armbands to protest U.S. involvement in Vietnam War).
11. See infra notes 15-59 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Stonewall Union v. City of Columbus, 931 F.2d 1130 (6th Cir. 1991) (up-
holding city ordinance requiring fees for parade permit, but reversing city's denial of
parade permit to gay rights organization), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 880 (1991).
13. E.g., City of Seven Hills, No. 258726, C.P. Ct., Cuyahoga County, Ohio. See Oster,
Protests Still Restricted, supra note 8; Judge Upholds Limits, supra note 8.
14. A word of limitation is appropriate. This Article seeks to explore the fundamental
tension between peace and public order on the one hand, and a certain limited form of free
expression on the other. To better focus on that tension, we will limit the scope of this
essay to cases involving counter-demonstration in the public fora. A delicate balance of
interests is implicated by demonstrations outside the public fora, the proper treatment of
which is neither necessary to the analysis nor within the scope of this essay. Likewise,
demonstrations that occur in the context of labor disputes give rise to a number of consid-
erations all their own, and are also beyond the scope of this Article. These include ques-
tions of labor law, and are far afield from the focus of this effort. See, e.g., International
Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982); International Bhd. of
Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957), reh'g denied, 354 U.S. 945 (1957).
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B. Counter-Demonstration in Historical Perspective
Counter-demonstration is a comparatively recent phenomenon.
One finds no reference to it in American history prior to the 1960s.'5
But in the past decade, initially and most visibly in the debate on
abortion, 16 counter-demonstration has become an increasingly perva-
sive phenomenon. Its use has spread to a broad range of volatile is-
sues, including race, 17 rap music,' gay rights,19 assisted suicide,20 the
death penalty,2 and the Holocaust.22 Indeed, counter-demonstration
15. The earliest instances of counter-demonstration occurred in the context of pro-war
and anti-war rallies during the Vietnam War. On February 20, 1965, three simultaneous
demonstrations, involving both pro-war and anti-war groups, took place in Washington,
D.C. on the White House sidewalk. A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 362 F. Supp.
1161, 1168 (D.D.C. 1973). Although approximately 420 people took part, the secret ser-
vice reported no incidents. Id. On April 28, 1967, the White House sidewalk was again the
scene of simultaneous demonstrations by pro-war and anti-war groups. Id. An estimated
200 persons took part. Id. Once again, the Secret Service reported no incidents. Id. Arab
and Israeli groups used the White House sidewalk and adjacent Lafayette Park to stage
simultaneous demonstrations on June 8, 1967. Id. An estimated 30,000 Jews rallied in the
park while an estimated 200 Arabs demonstrated on the White House sidewalk. Id Police
reported "hostility and tension," but no arrests. Id. at 1168-69. In November 1972, the
Interior Department published regulations expressly permitting "simultaneous demonstra-
tions" on the White House sidewalk and in Lafayette Park. Id. at 1167.
16. See supra note 5.
17. Chris Black, City Puts $350,000 Price Tag on Parade Protection, Services, BosTON
GLOBE, May 11, 1994, at 27; NAACP to Demonstrate Against KKK, Wires, Feb. 27, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; Gregory Tejeda, Ryan Says KKK Can Rally
on West Side of Statehouse Because East Side Taken, Wires, Nov. 19, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; Neo-Nazi Group Wins Bid for Rally, LEGAL INTELLI-
GENCER, Nov. 4, 1993, at 7, available in LEXIS, News Library, LGLINT File; Protesters
Chant "Go Home Nazis" at White Power Rally, Reuters, Apr. 24, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, REUNA File; Patricia Bond, Anti-Skinhead Rally Planned to Counter Vigil,
Wires, Dec. 8, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File [hereinafter Bond, Anti-
Skinhead Rally].
18. Playthell Benjamin, Rap on the Knuckles, SUNDAY TiMES (NEw YORK), June 13,
1993 (rappers counter-demonstrate against the Reverend Calvin Butts, who was protesting
"negative" rap music).
19. Domestic News: Georgia, UPI, Aug. 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File; Rene Sanchez & Linda Wheeler, Gays Demand Rights in Six-Hour March; A
Call for Equality, Tolerance, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 1993, at Al; Thousands March in U.S.
Gay Rights Parades, Reuters, June 25, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUNA
File; Estelle Lander, Parade Highlights Gay Pride, Protest, NEwSDAY (NEw YORK), June
27, 1988, at 21.
20. Carol J. Castaneda, Aided-Suicide Ban Faces Challenge; ACLU Says the Decision
to Die an Individual Right, USA TODAY, Mar. 1, 1993, at 6A.
21. Paul W. Valentine, Thanos Waits To Die as a Maryland Storm Rises; Battle Over
Death Penalty Centers on Convicted Killer, WASH. PoST, Oct. 31, 1993, at Bi; Catherine
Chriss, Anti-Death Penalty Movement Snowballs to Support Graham, HOUSTON CHRON.,
July 25, 1993, at A13; Brian Rooney, Death Watch Ends Outside San Quentin, UPI, Apr. 2,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; Andrew Fegelman, Indiana Gives
Vandiver His Death Wish, Cs. TmRB., Oct. 16, 1985, at 2.
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has entered the realm of mainstream politics; it was employed in the
last presidential election,2 3 and has surfaced in debates on gun con-
trol,24 health care,25 taxes,26 education 7-even the merits of Rush
Limbaugh as a suitable representative of the citrus industry.23 Those
who employ it are cognizant of its dialectic function: to confront and
refute an opposing viewpoint.
Ironically, in some of the most polarized debates, the presence of
counter-demonstrators is supported, even welcomed, by their oppo-
nents.2 9 This attitude, expressed most often in the context of abor-
tion,30 appears grounded upon two related notions: first, that the
debate is a contest between two starkly different viewpoints; 31 and
second, that the presence of "the other side" helps to make each side's
message more vivid and dramatic.32 Thus, an Operation Rescue
leader acknowledged that "[our demonstrations] are more effective
22. See Oster, Protests Still Restricted, supra note 8; Judge Upholds Limits, supra note
8; Oster, Seven Hills Ban, supra note 7.
23. Glenn, DeWine Supporters Get Ugly, UPI, Nov. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Wires File; B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., The 1992 Campaign: Campaign Trai" Quiet
Hecklers Receive Thanks from President, N.Y. Timrs, Oct. 3, 1992, § 1, at 10.
24. Simon's Rock Students, Faculty Lobby for Gun Control, UPI, Apr. 8, 1993, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
25. Republicans' Anger at "Dirty Tricks," MARKrTLErErR, Dec. 13, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, NWSLTR File; Robin Toner, Partisan Jostling Frays Health Care
Cooperation, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 3, 1993, at A24.
26. Few Tax Supporters, Protesters Turn Out for Rally in Stafford, HARTFORD COu-
RANT, Oct. 11, 1992, at B4.
27. Ronald Smothers, U.S. Moves To Oust Principal in Furor on Interracial Dating,
N.Y. Timms, May 18, 1994, at A20; Keith Ervin, Pasco Schools Chief Wins Tense Standoff,
SEATrLE Tnvms, May 1, 1993, at Al.
28. Jerry Jackson, Feminists Demonstrate Against Florida Orange Juice in Five Cities;
The Citrus Commission Says Most Callers to Its Office Support Its Alignment with Rush
Limbaugh, ORLANDO SEn mNL, March 11, 1994, at B1.
29. Minnesota: Terry Attracts Counter-Demonstrators, American Political Network,
May 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (remarks of Randall Terry, founder of
Operation Rescue) [hereinafter Terry Attracts Counter-Demonstrators]; New York- Show-
down Starts Today, Not Without Counter Effort, American Political Network, Apr. 21,1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (remarks of Keith Tucci, Operation Rescue official)
[hereinafter Showdown Starts]; Ethan Rarick, Abortion Opponents, Gay Rights Activists in
Shoving Match, UPI, Mar. 6, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (remarks
of T.J. Bailey, Political Director of the Oregon Citizens Alliance, a conservative, pro-life
group) [hereinafter Rarick, Shoving Match].
30. See supra note 29.
31. Terry Attracts Counter-Demonstrators, supra note 29 (Randall Terry, founder of
Operation Rescue, said of the pro-choice counter-demonstrators: "I'm pleased that we can
generate antagonism because I know we are doing our job.... There are only two camps,
[the Christians] and the pagans. That's it.").
32. Showdown Starts, supra note 29.
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when there are pro-aborts around.133 And another pro-life leader,
welcoming the presence of counter-demonstrators, concluded simply,
"We couldn't have a dog without the tail."'  Thus, even in the most
hotly contested debates, isolating one side from the other may actually
muffle the message of each.3 5
C. The Virtues of Counter-Demonstration
The utility of counter-demonstration-its appeal to the would-be
protester, and its capacity to advance public discourse on a given sub-
ject-stems from a variety of factors. First and foremost, from the
standpoint of public discourse, is its tendency to juxtapose competing
viewpoints. From the protester's perspective, it affords the most di-
rect means of confronting and refuting a rival message. Moreover, the
need for confronting an opponent inperson may be especially compel-
ling if a forum that is uniquely pertinent to the dispute has been cho-
sen: an abortion clinic, for example, or the site of a nuclear facility.
Indeed, being there in person may be part and parcel of one's
message-like the Holocaust survivors who picket the home of John
Demjanjuk and seek to convey, by their very presence, eternal vigi-
lance and the bearing of moral witness.36 Finally, there is the special
nature of the street as a forum for protest. No other forum is so read-
ily accessible-and taking to the street is a particularly emphatic way
to express an opinion.
33. Id.
34. Rarick, Shoving Match, supra note 29.
35. Though counter-demonstrations have greeted the increasingly visible speech activ-
ities of the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacist groups, see supra note 17, the
NAACP has consciously decided to ignore such groups, thereby denying them the added
publicity that counter-demonstration can produce. Watching the Klan Watchers, PLAIN
DEALER (CLEvELAND), Mar. 5, 1994, at 1OB; Robert L. Steinback, Ignoring Klan Is a
Good Way To Defeat Hatred, MrAmi HERALD, Jan. 19, 1993, at B1. Others, such as Guerry
Hodderson of the Freedom Socialist Party, disagree: "Nazis thrive on obscurity...
They're growing and we need to defend ourselves now, rather than when they're strong
and marching down Fourth Avenue." Bond, Anti-Skinhead Rally, supra note 17. Some
NAACP members disagree with the organization's decision to eschew counter-demonstra-
tion. Watching the Klan Watchers, supra. A few have even resigned from leadership posi-
tions in order to confront the Klan in person. Id, Lacy Steele, President of the NAACP's
Seattle chapter, said that following police instructions to ignore a Nazi rally would be fatal
to the ideals of human rights. Bond, Anti-Skinhead Rally, supra note 17. "Had we [the
black community] listened to what the authorities said," observed Steele, "we would not be
where we are today." Id
36. Don Terry, Seven Hills Journal. On Demjanjuk's Street, Support Meets Outrage,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 24, 1993, at A10 [hereinafter Terry, Seven Hills Journal].
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1. Advancing Public Discourse Through the Juxtaposition of
Competing Viewpoints
Robust debate on public issues is essential to the vitality of our
democracy.37 Citizens often make choices on matters of public policy
based on their assessment of competing viewpoints.38 One virtue of
counter-demonstration is that it results, almost literally, in the colli-
sion of competing viewpoints. By placing them in close juxtaposition,
counter-demonstration sharpens the debate by highlighting differ-
ences between the two sides. Thus, counter-demonstration advances
public discourse on a given subject by presenting citizens with a stark
choice, 9 in a dramatic context, between rival perspectives.
2. The Most Direct Means of Confronting and Refuting a Rival
Message
The obvious appeal of counter-demonstration is that it affords
protesters the most direct means of confronting and refuting a
message that they oppose. By appearing in person to counter an op-
ponent, one conveys a more emphatic message, and evinces more
steadfast commitment to a cause, than if one had merely mailed a let-
ter to the editor. In the words of one pro-choice counter-demonstra-
37. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ("[S]peech concerning public af-
fairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government."); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964) (recognizing "a profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks
on government and public officials"); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)
("The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion....
[I]t is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains re-
sponsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected.") (citation omitted);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Those who won
our independence.., believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think
are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; ... that the greatest menace to freedom is
an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a funda-
mental principle of the American government.").
38. As Thomas Jefferson observed, "[T]he public judgment will correct false reason-
ings and opinions, on a full hearing of all parties." SAUL K. PADOVER, THOMAS JEFFER-
SON AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERiCAN FREEDOM 132 (1965) (quoting second
inaugural address).
39. Occasionally, the very starkness of the choice may prompt some citizens to discern
that both sides are wrong and that, as in Hegelian dialectic, the truth may be found in a
synthesis of the two perspectives. See WiLL DURAN, Tim STORY OF PwILosoPHY 223-24
(1926) (describing the "dialectical movement" in Hegel's philosophy). Once again,
counter-demonstration will have helped to produce this insight by juxtaposing the rival
viewpoints.
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tor: "We are pro-active. We are here in their face. We are not
violent. We are on a mission to expose their lies." 40
Meeting the enemy face to face is qualitatively different from
countering his or her message through any other medium of expres-
sion. It is more dramatic, more forceful, permits immediate give and
take with the other side, and-from a protester's perspective-is ca-
pable of affording greater emotional release.
3. Sharing the Unique Forum
In many instances, there is a specific forum which is uniquely per-
tinent to a debate. Counter-demonstration is often the result of rival
groups clamoring to demonstrate at the same unique forum.4 1
In the context of any public issue, it is often the case that one
forum is particularly symbolic of, or singularly relevant to, the debate.
Demonstrators protesting government policy, for example, have sta-
tioned themselves in the park opposite the White House,42 along the
route of a presidential motorcade,43 in the shadow of the Republican
national convention, 44 outside a foreign embassy,45 in the audience at
a governor's inauguration speechf and in front of a mayor's house.47
In Cox v. Louisiana,48 civil rights activists marched on the courthouse
where their brethren were jailed.49 Holocaust survivors have picketed
40, Joe Frolik, Operation Rescue Softens Style, Image; Anti-Abortion Activists Use New
Tactics, PLAiN DEALER (CLEvELAND), July 13, 1993, at 10A.
41. Olivieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987);
Terry, Seven Hills Journal, supra note 36 (Holocaust survivors and Ku Klux Klansmen both
seek access to the same unique forum, the street where John Demjanjuk resides, to express
outrage or support at the suspected Nazi prison guard's return to the United States).
42, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
43. Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1975).
44. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
45. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
46. ACT-UP v. Walp, 755 F. Supp. 1281 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
47. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); New Alliance Party v. Dinkins,
743 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
48. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
49. Id. at 539-42. At oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court, the prosecution
unwittingly supplied an illustration of the "unique forum" concept when citing testimony
adduced at trial:
The trial judge went to great lengths in asking [one of the defendant protesters]
on the witness stand, "Why the courthouse? [The jail and the courthouse were
both in the same building.] Why did you come down here? Why not on the old
State Capitol grounds or some other part of town, some public park? Why here?"
And [the defendant] says, "Here's where they were arrested and we came to pro-
test it; we came here."
MAY IT PLEAsE THE COURT: THE MosT SIGNIFICANT ORAL ARGUMENTS MADE BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT SINCE 1955 112 (Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds., 1993) (re-
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the home of John Demanjuk,5° advocates and opponents of gay rights
have raised their voices at New York City's annual Gay Pride
Parade, 51 anti-war protesters have sailed before the viewing stand at a
parade of Navy ships52 --and, as we have seen so often, protesters on
both sides of the abortion debate have confronted each other at clin-
ics5 3 and doctors' homes.54
In all of these cases, protesters identified a forum that was itself
resonant with meaning-a forum whose unique connection to the con-
troversy amplified their message, lent it gravity, or imbued it with
poignancy. A unique forum may well exist for many public controver-
sies, contestants on both sides of the debate will likely clamor for ac-
cess to it, and access to the forum may be particularly desirable at a
specific moment in time-the appearance there, for example, of a
public official or ceremony. All these factors point not only to the
likelihood that counter-demonstrations will take place, but also to the
recognition that they should be permitted to take place.
4. Vigilance as a Message in Itself
Confronting an opponent in person may not merely be desirable,
it may be part and parcel of the message. In some instances, one's
very presence there is meant to convey resistance, vigilance, and the
bearing of moral witness against those on the other side. This is very
much the message of many pro-life protesters, whose continuous pres-
ence at abortion clinics is meant to convey both resolute vigilance and
moral outrage.55 The very same message is advanced by the Jewish
groups and Holocaust survivors who patrol the street where John
Demjanjuk resides. 56 Such a message can only be conveyed by being
there. Particularly with a message of vigilance, it is necessary for the
protester to be within sight of the confronted evil.
marks of Ralph Roy, counsel for the State of Louisiana, at oral argument in Cox v.
Louisiana).
50. Terry, Seven Hills Journal, supra note 36. At the City's request, a state trial court
enjoined the simultaneous presence on Demjanjuk's street of groups with opposing view-
points on his return to the United States. City of Seven Hills v. Aryan Nations, No.
258726, C.P. Ct., Cuyahoga County, Ohio (Dec. 15,1993), affd, No. 66754,1995 Ohio App.
Lexis 575 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1995).
51. Olivieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987).
52. Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1990).
53. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
54. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
55. See, eg., Madsen, 114 S. Ct. 2516.
56. Terry, Seven Hills Journal, supra note 36.
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To interfere, then, with the right of such speakers to be present at
such a forum-to bar them, for example, from sharing the forum with
those whom they oppose-is literally to suppress the content of their
message.
5. The Special Nature of the Street as a Forum for Protest
To the extent that counter-demonstration represents a distinct
form of street protest, its appeal to prospective speakers is two-fold:
No other forum is so readily accessible as the street, and taking to the
street is a particularly emphatic way to express an opinion.
Streets and sidewalks have long been assigned special status
under American law as permissible venues for public assembly and
debate.17 Moreover, streets and sidewalks do not lose their status as
traditional public fora simply because they run through a residential
neighborhood.58
But even beyond the special legal status with which it is endowed,
the street is a forum like no other because it is always there, readily
accessible, and available to everyone. Perhaps most important,
protestors can make themselves heard there without anyone's assist-
ance. Unlike a letter to the newspaper, their voices will be heard re-
gardless of whether an editor agrees to print their message. Unlike
talk radio, their voices will be heard regardless of whether they can
get through to the disc jockey. Their voices will be heard regardless of
whether television stations decide to cover the event. In short, the
street is superdemocratic. It is there for everyone and, even though it
is not a medium that will widely disseminate a message, it permits
one's ideas to be conveyed unedited.
Moreover, taking one's message to the street is a stronger, more
emphatic way to speak than writing a letter to the editor. There is
something about it that conveys more conviction and more resolve.59
Holding a sign in the rain simply evinces greater commitment than any
57. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496,515-16 (1939) (striking down an ordinance requiring a
permit to use public streets and parks for speech activities) ("[U]se of the streets and pub-
lic places [for assembly and debate on public issues] has, from ancient times, been a part of
the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege . . . to use the
streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in
the interest of all ... but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.").
58. Frisby, 487 U.S. 474.
59. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 840 (2d ed. 1988) (ob-
serving that civil rights activists of the 1960s took to the streets "because no other medium
could adequately register either the intensity of their protest or the solidarity of their
movement").
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letter, no matter how eloquent. It is also a better vehicle for venting
one's anger, for displaying one's outrage.
All of these factors make counter-demonstration-a mode of ex-
pression that is inextricably tied to the street-an especially vital and
accessible means of protest.
D. The Few Cases Touching Upon This Subject
Only two cases60 expressly address the question of First Amend-
ment protection for counter-demonstration: City of Seven Hills v. Ar-
60. Aside from Seven Hills and Olivieri, there is little beyond a smattering of dicta on
the question. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1972) ("[T]wo parades cannot
march on the same street simultaneously, and government may allow only one."); Gregory
v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (overturning disorderly conduct convictions of
protesters who were arrested while picketing mayor's residence); id. at 117 (Black, J., dis-
senting) ("These facts disclosed by the record point unerringly to one conclusion, namely,
that when groups with diametrically opposed, deep-seated views are permitted to air their
emotional grievances, side by side, on city streets, tranquility and order cannot be main-
tained even by the joint efforts of the finest and best officers and of those who desire to be
the most law-abiding protesters of their grievances."); Shamloo v. Mississippi State Bd. of
Trustees, 620 F.2d 516, 523 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding requirement that on-campus demon-
strations be scheduled in advance with university officials, but striking down a provision
that vested officials with the power to disapprove all but "wholesome" activities) (observ-
ing that it had previously upheld advance registration requirements, which the court de-
scribed as "a reasonable method to avoid the problem of simultaneous and competing
demonstrations"); Bayless v. Martine, 430 F.2d 873, 878 (5th Cir. 1970) (upholding univer-
sity regulation requiring 48-hour advance reservations for on-campus meetings) ("The re-
quirement of reserving the Student Expression Area 48 hours in advance is a reasonable
method by which the problem of simultaneous and competing demonstrations could be
avoided. While a university could be required under appropriate circumstances to permit
both the Students for a Democratic Society and the Young Americans for Freedom to
demonstrate, no one could reasonably contend that the Constitution required the college
to permit such demonstrations to take place at the same time and in the same area.");
Partisan Defense Comm. v. Ryan, 841 F. Supp. 247 (C.D. Ill. 1994) (state officials granted
plaintiff a permit to conduct a counter-demonstration on the north steps of the State Capi-
tol building while the KKK would be holding a rally on the east steps; plaintiff also sought,
but was denied, permission to point his sound system in the Klan's direction in order to
drown out their speech; district court rejects plaintiff's prayer for injunctive relief); A
Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 362 F. Supp. 1161 (D.D.C. 1973) (upholding Interior
Department regulations governing demonstrations on the White House sidewalk and in
Lafayette Park permitting simultaneous demonstrations but requiring that the protest
groups supply their own marshals), aff'd, 516 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Cf. Sanders v.
United States, 518 F. Supp. 728, 730 (D.D.C. 1981) (rejecting civil rights claims by plaintiff
who asserted that his First Amendment freedoms had been violated when, for the purpose
of publicizing what he believed were three mysterious deaths in South Carolina, he ven-
tured without a permit onto the Ellipse in Washington, D.C. while an annual event, the
"Pageant for Peace," was being held, and, after placing three small signs beneath the South
Carolina Christmas tree and then standing beside the tree with a larger sign, he was ar-
rested) ("[M]ore fundamental[ ] is the interest in guaranteeing citizens the right to partici-
pate in events or demonstrations of their own choosing without being subjected to
interference by other citizens. A physical intrusion into another event for the purpose of
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yan Nations61 and Olivieri v. Ward.62  In both cases, counter-
demonstrators were enjoined from appearing at a desired forum at the
same time as the group they opposed.
1. Seven Hills
Anticipating the return of its most famous resident, accused Nazi
war criminal John Demjanjuk,63 the City of Seven Hills, Ohio imposed
interjecting one's own convictions or beliefs is by definition an interference, regardless of
how insubstantial or insignificant it might appear. As such, it is an interference with the
rights of other citizens to enjoy the event or demonstration in which they have chosen to
participate, and in an area reserved for them.").
Though it does not directly address the right to counter-demonstrate, one case, We've
Carried the Rich for 200 Years, Let's Get Them Off Our Backs-July 4th Coalition v. Phila-
delphia, 414 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Pa. 1976), comes sufficiently close to warrant our attention.
Vowing to "'fight [the rich] on the day they choose to celebrate their bloodsoaked rule,"'
plaintiffs, "an amalgam of self-styled dissidents," sought to conduct a massive counter-
demonstration in Philadelphia on the date of the Bicentennial, with a view toward "drama-
tizing the injustices of the American System as it has evolved over the last two centuries."
Id. at 612. City officials rejected plaintiffs' permit applications for a parade and cultural
events. Id. at 613. The court held that plaintiffs should be permitted to hold their parade
and rally, but not within 12 blocks of the officially sponsored festivities, which were sched-
uled to include a speech by the President of the United States and a six to eight hour
parade with 50,000 participants and an estimated 300,000 spectators. Id at 613-14. Ob-
serving that "two parades cannot march on the street simultaneously and the city may
allow only one," id. at 613 (citing Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941)), the
court asserted:
[T]he vast majority of the people that day will be exercising First Amendment
rights by attending and participating in the officially sponsored activities. It seems
to me that they ought to be free to do so without fear of interference from those who
wish to promote an opposing view. Moreover, in light of the plaintiffs' militant
attitude and provocative posture as exemplified in their broadside .... common
sense dictates that the two parades should be kept separate in order to avoid any
untoward incident which would trigger a confrontation and disrupt the peaceful
activities of either or both groups.
Id. at 614 (emphasis added). Though the court's language evinces little enthusiasm for any
right to counter-demonstrate, July 4th Coalition can best be explained by the huge number
of people involved, and the physical impossibility of juxtaposing the two events in one
place, id. at 614-15 (citing the convergence of cars and people within a comparatively lim-
ited physical space). The plaintiffs estimated that 5,000 to 10,000 participants would attend
their parade and rally, id. at 612-13, while the official festivities were to involve a combined
350,000 participants and spectators, id. at 613.
61. No. 258726, C.P. Ct., Cuyahoga County, Ohio (Dec. 15, 1993), aff'd, No. 66754,
1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 575 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1995).
62. 801 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987).
63. In 1981, Mr. Deijanjuk was stripped of his U.S. citizenship in connection with
allegations that he had participated in the Nazi campaign of genocide known as the Holo-
caust. After extradition and trial in the State of Israel, Mr. Demjanjuk was convicted and
sentenced to death. But the Israeli Supreme Court overturned his conviction in early Sep-
tember 1993, thereby paving the way for his return to the United States. City of Seven
Hills, No. 258726, C.P. Ct., Cuyahoga County, Ohio, at 1 n.1.
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a virtual ban on picketing in its residential neighborhoods."4 Several
days later, just as Mr. Demjanjuk was gaining his release from Israeli
prison authorities,65 picketers staged a series of protests at his Seven
Hills home.6 These protests, held on September 22 and 23, 1993,67
were led by Rabbi Avi Weiss and included survivors of the Holo-
caust.68  On September 25, 1993, members of the Ku Klux Klan
marched at the same location in support of Mr. Demjanjuk.69 TWo
days later, the City of Seven Hills filed a civil suit in state court seek-
ing to enjoin parties named and unnamed from violating its picketing
ordinance.70 The court issued a temporary restraining order the next
day,71 and protests continued in compliance with a series of injunctive
schemes throughout the autumn months of 1993.72
After a three-day evidentiary hearing in late October, the court
issued a permanent injunction on December 15, 1993. In the opinion
that accompanied its injunction, the court struck down the city's pick-
eting ordinance as unconstitutionally overbroad,7 3 but left in place-
with minor modifications-a detailed order governing the conduct of
demonstrations on Mr. Demjanjuk's street.74
The permanent injunction decreed that protests could be staged
seven days a week, but held that no more than twenty-five demonstra-
tors could use the forum at any one time.75 Prospective picketers
were required to register in advance with the Seven Hills Law Depart-
ment in order to protest during one of two time slots (either from
64. The ordinance read in pertinent part: "It is unlawful for any person to engage in
unlawful [sic] picketing before or about the residence or dwelling occupied by any individ-
ual in the City of Seven Hills." SEVEN HLLS, OMO, CODIFIED ORDINANcE § 511.02
(1993). The ordinance defined "unlawful picketing" as: "[Plicketing ... directed at or
conducted primarily before, or about, or in the immediate vicinity of the land upon which
the dwelling of any individual is situated .... Id. § 511.01(b)(1).
65. Mr. Demjanjuk made his return to the United States on September 22, 1993. City
of Seven Hills, No. 258726, C.P. Ct., Cuyahoga County, Ohio, at 1 n.1.
66. Terry, Seven Hills Journal, supra note 36.
67. Brief for Defendant/Cross-Appellant Rabbi Avi Weiss at 1, City of Seven Hills v.
Aryan Nations, No. 66754, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 575 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1995)
[hereinafter Weiss Brief].
68. Terry, Seven Hills Journal, supra note 36.
69. Weiss Brief, supra note 67, at 1.
70. Weiss Brief, supra note 67, at 1. The city's lawsuit was filed on September 27,
1993. Id.
71. City of Seven Hills, No. 258726, C.P. Ct., Cuyahoga County, Ohio at 1 (temporary
restraining order issued on Sept. 28, 1993).
72. Weiss Brief, supra note 67, at 1.
73. City of Seven Hills, No. 258726, C.P. Ct., Cuyahoga County, Ohio, at 5-6.
74. Id. at 6-7.
75. Id. (permanent injunction at 1).
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10:00 a.m. to noon or from 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.). 76 The Law Depart-
ment was ordered to ensure, when scheduling the protests, that no
groups with differing opinions regarding the Demjanjuk affair be per-
mitted simultaneous access to the forum.7 7
Conspicuously absent from the record in Seven Hills is any sug-
gestion that the rival protest groups were poised to clash with one
another. The most visible counterparts-Rabbi Weiss and the Holo-
caust survivors on one side, the Ku Klux Klan on the other-both
testified that they would not initiate violence, even if their picketing
brought them face to face with the other side.78 Nevertheless, the trial
court summarily concluded that the simultaneous presence of these
groups "poses a clear impending danger of irreparable injury to the
City and its residents. 79
76. Id. (permanent injunction at 1-2).
77. Id
78. Weiss Brief, supra note 67, at 26-27. Rabbi Weiss, leader of the Coalition for Jew-
ish Concerns, repeatedly testified to his lifelong commitment to non-violent protest:
Q: And all the picketing that you have taken part in has been peaceful, correct?
A: Absolutely. Everything I do is peaceful.
Trial Transcript at 80-81, City of Seven Hills v. Aryan Nations, No. 258726, C.P. Ct.,
Cuyahoga County, Ohio (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter Trial Transcript]. The Rabbi's group
had cooperated fully with Seven Hills police during demonstrations near the Demjanjuk
home:
Q: The police have never had to use force or use the threat of arrest as a means
of crowd control with regard to your protests?
A: Never. Whatever the police have asked us to do... we immediately followed
their orders.
Id at 119-20. Robert Armstrong, Grand Dragon of the State of Ohio and National Impe-
rial Chaplain of the Ku Klux Klan, consistently testified that his group would not initiate
violence, even while sharing the forum with Jewish demonstrators:
Q: Isn't it a fair statement that when the KKK is there alone there doesn't seem
to be a problem, but when the KKK is joined with an opposing side there is the
real potential for injuries?
A: With-if we demonstrate, there will be no injuries from any part of us. We
will not bother anyone. We hold up protest signs but we will not attack anyone.
Q: [W]ould it be possible for you and your group to protest at the same time as
the Jews?
A: It would be possible because we can contain ourselves. If they can contain
theirselves [sic], that's fine.
Q: So if the Jewish protesters were [able] to remain non-violent, you're confident
that your protesters would remain non-violent as well?
A: Absolutely.
Id at 172, 176, 177.
79. City of Seven Hills, No. 258726, C.P. Ct., Cuyahoga County, Ohio, at 6.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
This conclusion was based on little, if any, concrete evidence.
The testimony that the city presented in support of injunctive relief
may be categorized into three broad classes of argument:
(1) Clandestine information available to the city showed vio-
lence to be the probable result of counter-demonstration;
(2) The nature of the groups seeking to demonstrate made vio-
lence the probable result of counter-demonstration;
(3) The nature of counter-demonstration itself made violence the
probable result of counter-demonstration.
The clandestine information-which linked Rabbi Weiss to a terrorist
organization-turned out at trial to be based on a ludicrous misunder-
standing, and utterly erroneous.8 0 Concerns about the violent procliv-
ities of the protest groups were based on unsubstantiated opinions, 81
80. Seven Hills Police Chief John Fechko claimed to have received clandestine infor-
mation from members of the Cleveland Jewish community linking Rabbi Weiss to the Kach
Party, an organization known for its violence and potentially responsible for a political
murder somewhere in New Jersey within the last decade. Trial Transcript, supra note 78, at
235-37, 239-40. Later testimony showed that belief to have been founded on a misunder-
standing and completely erroneous. First, Chief Fechko mistakenly assumed that Kach
was the name of the Rabbi's activist group, the Coalition for Jewish Concerns:
Q: I'll ask you again. Do you know what the Kach organization is, sir?
A: It's the Coalition for Jewish Concerns.
Id. at 254. In fact, nothing of the sort is true. Fred Taub, a member of the Coalition for
Jewish Concerns, exposed Chief Fechko's mistake in his testimony:
Q: Sir, are you affiliated with a group called Committee of Jewish Concerns, I
believe it's called Kach?
A: No. A group called Coalition for Jewish Concerns.
Q: For Jewish Concerns?
A: Correct.
Q: Is that what "Kach" stands for?
A: No. I think you are referring to a different organization.
IL at 275. It is a very different organization indeed. Mr. Taub later testified that Kach was
an Israeli political party no longer in existence. ML at 299. Chief Fechko erroneously be-
lieved that the Coalition for Jewish Concerns was known by the English acronym "CIC,"
which he took to be Kach. Id at 235, 254-56. In fact, the Coalition for Jewish Concerns is
otherwise known only by its Hebrew name, the English transliteration of which is
"Amcha." Id. at 300. It is not only distinct from the Kach Party, id., but absolutely com-
mitted to the principle of non-violent protest-a fact expressly testified to by its leader,
Rabbi Weiss, U at 81, 121, and its principal Cleveland organizer, Mr. Taub, id. at 300.
Chief Fechko's testimony that clandestine information linked Rabbi Weiss to the Kach
Party was thus wholly without foundation, based on faulty assumptions, and incapable of
supporting the assertion that counter-demonstration posed a clear and present danger of
lawlessness.
81. Like his belief that Rabbi Weiss was the leader of a militant extremist group, Chief
Fechko's opinions regarding the other named defendants-the KKK, the Aryan Nations,
and the Jewish Defense Organization-were equally without a strong factual foundation.
On cross-examination, the Chief conceded that his assessment of those groups was based
solely upon news accounts, Trial Transcript, supra note 78, at 233; that he had never in-
quired into their respective histories, beliefs, tactics, or tendencies, id. at 234, 250-53; that
he had never studied their relationships with one another, id. at 253; that he had never
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were contradicted by the testimony of the protesters themselves, 82 and
were founded upon an unproven theory-a sort of "spontaneous com-
bustion" thesis-in which the admixture of particular groups is re-
garded, a priori, as the recipe for an explosion.8 3 Finally, taking the
interviewed any of their members to determine the seriousness of their intent to engage in
violent conduct in Seven Hills, id. at 234; and that none of their members had ever
threatened to engage in such conduct, Ud. at 234. He spoke interchangeably of the Jewish
Defense League ("JDL") and the Jewish Defense Organization ("JDO"), and thus ap-
peared ignorant of their separate identities, id. at 242-45; he asserted incorrectly that the
JDL still exists, id. at 251-52, displaying an unawareness that the JDL disbanded after the
death of Meir Kehane, id. at 302; indeed, he had never heard of Meir Kehane, id. at 252;
nor could he identify Betar, L at 252, a Jewish youth group that had joined in several
peaceful protests in Seven Hills by the time of Chief Fechko's testimony in October 1993,
id. at 293-94.
Members of the Seven Hills City Council, one of whom predicted "chaos" in Seven
Hills if counter-demonstrations were permitted to occur, ld. at 41, likewise proved unable
to identify a specific threat:
Q: Councilman, let me take you in a somewhat different direction. Are you
aware of any threats by the protesters who have been on [Mr. Demjanjuk's] street
of violence?
A: No.
Ud. at 51 (testimony of Councilman John Miller). Councilman Frank J. Petro testified that
he felt threatened by the protests, but when asked to articulate a reason for his fear, he
could offer nothing more than vague apprehension:
Q: Okay. So there is a possibility of some threat or harm, but you can't point to
any specific incident that represents an imminent threat of violence, isn't that
true?
A: Not at this time.
Q: All right. So there is some vague, undifferentiated fear of possible future
violence?
A: Yes.
Id. at 35, 36.
82. See supra note 78 (quoting the testimony of Rabbi Weiss and of Robert Arm-
strong, Grand Dragon of the State of Ohio and National Imperial Chaplain of the Ku Klux
Klan).
83. Chief Fechko was asked what would happen if the Coalition for Jewish Concerns,
the Ku Klux Klan, and the Aryan Nations Loyalist Party were permitted to share the same
forum. He was never qualified as an expert, and during the course of his 24-year career,
received no riot control training beyond the minimum afforded police cadets. Trial Tran-
script, supra note 78, at 210. Chief Fechko opined:
A: In my professional opinion, if those three groups protested at the same time,
at the same location, I think violence would erupt.
Id. at 218. On direct examination, Mayor George Chandick offered a similar assessment of
potential encounters:
Q: What do you think would happen if the Ku Klux Klan was there for picketing
at the same time the Rabbi's group was there?
A: I would hate to imagine.
Q: Do you think that if those groups were massed together that violence would
be imminent?
A: There would be no question in my mind.
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spontaneous combustion thesis to an even higher plane of abstraction,
both the Mayor s 4 and the Police Chief8" asserted that counter-demon-
stration, by its very nature, always presents an unacceptable invitation
to violence. Whether such a record is sufficient to support a broad
injunctive 6 ban on counter-demonstration has yet to be decided on
appealY
2. Olivieri
Taken superficially, Olivieri v. Ward8 might be misread to offer
support for the proposition that counter-demonstrators can be tempo-
rally separated from one another consistent with the First Amend-
Id at 63. Councilman John Miller articulated his own fears regarding these groups:
Q: What do you think would happen if the Nazis and the [S]kinheads and the
Aryan Nations were picketing in your city, sir?
A: All at the same time?
Q: Yes, sir.
A: We would have chaos.
Id at 41. On direct examination, Mayor Chandick stated the reasoning behind his opinion:
Q! What would happen if you included the Aryan Nations and the [S]kinheads
and the neo-Nazis to [the Rabbi's] group, sir?
A: [Y]ou'd have to be kidding because we would be putting together antagonistic
groups that-that have been well-known throughout the entire country.
Id at 64. In effect, the Mayor asserted that the interaction of these groups might be in-
ferred from common knowledge, revealing that his opinion was unsubstantiated by fact.
84. Trial Transcript, supra note 78, at 69.
85. Id at 218.
86. It is black-letter law that an injunction shall not be issued absent the threat of
irreparable harm. In short, there must be some precipitating event, some tangible display
of impending violence to justify an injunction. Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. Mc-
Millan, 866 F.2d 788, 795 (5th Cir. 1989). An injunction against the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms, moreover, is an extraordinary remedy. Id at 790. The Supreme
Court has held that restraints based upon the fear of violent reaction to the prohibited
expression are improper, absent a clear and present danger of imminent lawlessness:
[F]reedom of speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless protected against cen-
sorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger
of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance,
or unrest.
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Recently, the Supreme Court held that injunctions directed at speech activities must be
subjected to a level of judicial scrutiny even more exacting than that traditionally reserved
for legislation touching upon speech. Madsen v. Women's Health Or., Inc., 114 S. Ct.
2516, 2524-25 (1994).
87. Though a state appellate court recently affirmed the injunction, City of Seven Hills
v. Aryan Nations, No. 66754, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 575 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1995),
the Ohio Supreme Court recently granted review. Seven Hills v. Aryan Nations, No. 95-
730 (Ohio Supreme Court) (review granted July 19, 1995). Tom Breckenridge, Court
Throws Out Seven Hills' Ban on Home Picketfing], PLAIN DEALER [CLEvELAND], Feb. 22,
1995.
88. 801 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987).
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ment. But a careful reading of Olivieri reveals that the Constitution
requires precisely the opposite result.
Olivieri grew out of counter-demonstrations against New York
City's Gay Pride Parade, an annual event along Fifth Avenue that
passed directly in front of St. Patrick's Cathedral, the Apostolic See of
the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York.8 9 Members of Dig-
nity, an organization of gay and lesbian Catholics, sought to hold a
peaceful vigil before the cathedral steps while the parade passed by.
The district court summarized the character and content of Dignity's
message:
Dignity sought to communicate... that, notwithstanding the
opposition of the institutional Church and its officials, Catholic
gays need not choose between their homosexuality and their
religion.... The audience Dignity is trying to reach includes all
other marchers in the Parade, especially Catholic or ex-Catholic
ones, as well as Parade spectators in the Cathedral area.9"
In response to both Dignity and the Gay Pride Parade itself, an
amalgam of conservative religious groups named the Committee for
the Defense of St. Patrick's ("the Committee") also sought to stand
on the cathedral sidewalk as the parade went by.91 To avoid a poten-
tial conflict between these two groups, beginning with the 1983
parade, New York City police issued orders "freezing" the sidewalk in
front of the cathedral, thereby denying access to Dignity, the Commit-
tee, and pedestrians during the Gay Pride Parade. 9
In 1986, Dignity challenged the police order freezing the side-
walk. The district court concluded that the order prohibiting Dignity
from demonstrating on the sidewalk during the parade was unconsti-
tutional, and therefore enjoined police from preventing fewer than
100 Dignity members from congregating on the cathedral sidewalk
during the parade.93
The City of New York appealed, and due to the parade's immi-
nence, the Second Circuit urged the parties to reach an agreement. 94
Both parties then agreed, in separate letters to the court, to protest for
forty-five minutes in an enclosed "pen" in front of the cathedral, with
their protests separated by thirty minutes.95 The groups could not
89. Id. at 603.
90. Olivieri v. Ward, 637 F. Supp. 851, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 795 F.2d 1005 (2d
Cir. 1986), modified, 801 F.2d. 602 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987).
91. 637 F. Supp. at 857.
92. Id, at 856.
93. lit at 875, 879.
94. 801 F.2d at 604.
95. Id,
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agree on a proper number of demonstrators, and on its own motion,
the Second Circuit imposed the following scheme: twenty-five mem-
bers of Dignity were permitted to protest within the pen for thirty
minutes, and, after a thirty-minute interval, twenty-five members of
the Committee were permitted to do the same. 6 While neither group
could be present in the pen during the other's demonstration, both
were expressly allowed to protest while the parade passed by.97
The district court had banned the Committee from the cathedral
sidewalk altogether, finding that the Committee sought only to disrupt
the vigil held there by Dignity.98 The Second Circuit overturned this
restriction as violative of the Committee's First Amendment rights.
The court of appeals noted that the conflicting values held by gay
demonstrators and members of the conservative Committee presented
a risk of conflict, but held:
[T]he potential for confrontation and violence is obviously pres-
ent when opposing groups share the same forum at the same
time. It is not up to the City or its officials to determine those
issues worth debating in the public forum. In the field of expres-
sion all ideas are considered equal. Thus both groups are enti-
tled to be present at St. Patrick's Cathedral during the Gay
Pride Parade.99
Thus, while Dignity and the Committee were not afforded simultane-
ous access to the pen, the Second Circuit expressly affirmed the Com-
mittee's right to voice its defense of the Church against open
homosexuality in a uniquely salient forum (in front of St. Patrick's
Cathedral) at a uniquely salient time (while the Gay Pride Parade
passed by).100
96. Id,
97. l
98. Id. at 606.
99. Id.
100. The Committee literally viewed itself as defending the cathedral from sacrilege.
This stance created conflict during prior Gay Pride Parades. Participants in the parade had
aimed extravagant gestures of derision and contempt at the Catholic faithful (excepting
Dignity) in previous years, Olivieri, 637 F. Supp. at 855-57, and, as a result of the tension
these affronts engendered, parade participants and Committee members had engaged in
violent scuffles, id. at 857.
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3. The Missing Element in Seven Hills and Olivieri: An Express
Recognition That Counter-Demonstration Is a Unique Form
of Expression Whose Protection Should Be No More
Subject to Compromise than the Right to
Protest Generally
Seven Hills and Olivieri present a variety of instructive similari-
ties and contrasts. Like the City of New York, the town of Seven Hills
sought to avoid violence by "freezing" the forum where protesters
wished to gather. Like the Ohio trial court, the Olivieri district court
held such a freeze unconstitutional, but went on to grant only compat-
ible groups (Dignity and the Gay Pride marchers) simultaneous access
to the forum in question. Like the cathedral in Olivieri, Mr.
Demjanjuk's house is an especially potent symbol to Rabbi Weiss pre-
cisely when his opponents seek to use the house to their own advan-
tage. Therefore, like the Second Circuit, the Seven Hills court should
have crafted a remedy that granted opposing groups (like the Gay
Pride marchers and the Committee) simultaneous access to the de-
sired forum.
Olivieri is significant because the Second Circuit held that the
Committee had a right to counter-demonstrate (1) in front of St. Pat-
rick's Cathedral, and (2) during the Gay Pride Parade. The Commit-
tee's message depended upon its timing and venue because it was a
message of resistance. The Committee sought to interpose itself be-
tween the Gay Pride Parade (which it saw as an affront to the Catholic
Church) and the cathedral (which it saw as the very symbol of the
Church). 1°1 To the Committee, the only salient time to voice this
message of opposition was during the parade itself, while marchers
directed their derision at the cathedral. Likewise, the only salient
place to demonstrate was in front of the cathedral, to "defend" it from
desecration.
The very same logic applies to the Seven Hills scenario. When-
ever anti-semitic groups rally in front of Mr. Demjanjuk's home, they
appropriate the symbolic value of his being home to enhance their
own messages of anti-semitism and Holocaust revisionism. Conse-
quently, it is then and there that Rabbi Weiss and his followers feel
compelled to deliver their own message of opposition to Holocaust
revisionism. The Rabbi's message is one of resistance and vigil, which,
like the Committee's message in Olivieri, seeks by its presence to pre-
vent a rival faction from appropriating without opposition the sym-
bolic value of a special site.
101. Id at 855.
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A superficial reading of Olivieri might focus only on the Second
Circuit's administrative separation of Dignity and the Committee.102
But a complete reading shows that the Second Circuit concluded that
it was simply unconstitutional to banish the Committee from the Gay
Pride Parade merely on the basis of its antagonism toward the march-
ers. Likewise, it was inappropriate for the Seven Hills court to con-
clude that the First Amendment rights of the rival factions were
nullified by their mutual antagonism.
Though the Second Circuit's Olivieri decision is a profoundly im-
portant step in the right direction, its analysis lacks the same critical
element that is missing in Seven Hills: an express recognition that
counter-demonstration is a unique form of expression whose protec-
tion should be no more subject to compromise than the right to pro-
test generally. That proposition is discussed in the next section of this
Article.
I. Positive Arguments in Favor of a Right to Counter-
Demonstration: The Right Can be Found in Existing
Law and in the Philosophical Justifications
for the First Amendment
Wo distinct arguments in favor of a right to counter-demonstra-
tion can be asserted: one based on existing free speech precedent, and
the other based on the philosophical justifications for the First
Amendment. In both contexts, the reasons for tolerating speech that
engenders the risk of public disorder apply with equal force to demon-
strators and counter-demonstrators alike.
A. Existing Precedent
The right to counter-demonstration can be found in existing case
law implicitly in every decision balancing the right to free expression
against concerns for public safety and civic order. This Article exam-
ines existing precedent at two separate levels: first, the limitations on
government power to restrict potentially volatile demonstrations; and
then, the limitations on government power to punish seditious speech.
102. Any such analysis would, even if taken alone, provide no compelling reason to
uphold the Seven Hills court's temporal separation of opposing groups on Mr. Demjanjuk's
street. It must be noted that in Olivieri, unlike Seven Hills, both Dignity and the Commit-
tee consented to being segregated into separate time slots. Olivieri, 801 F.2d at 604, 607.
No such consent was ever manifested by any of the protesters in Seven Hills.
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1. Limitations on Government Power to Restrict Potentially Volatile
Demonstrations
First Amendment jurisprudence has long imposed severe limita-
tions on government's power to restrict public demonstrations, even
where the potential for discord or conflict is great. Based on a com-
mitment to "robust,'10 3 "uninhibited,' 0 4 even "provocative" 10 5 de-
bate, federal courts have held that the right to demonstrate may not
be left to the unfettered whims of local officials.' 6 When issuing a
permit, officials may consider neither the controversial nature of the
speaker's viewpoint'0 7 nor its potential for inspiring a hostile re-
sponse. 0 8 If a hostile audience actually materializes, the government
is not only barred from silencing the speaker, 0 9 but often has an af-
firmative duty to protect the speaker." 0
These well-established precedents, and the reasoning on which
they are based, apply just as readily to counter-demonstration as to
any other form of protest.
a. General Limits on State Authority to Deny or Condition Permits
Courts have consistently invalidated licensing schemes that
vested government officials with discretionary power to grant or with-
hold permission to demonstrate."' Any scheme that vests arbitrary
103. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
104. Id
105. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
106. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225-26 (1990). See infra notes 111-
116 and accompanying text.
107. Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire, Inc. v. District of Colum-
bia, 972 F.2d 365, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that officials may only consider the nature
of the speech and the potential response if there is a compelling state interest at stake and
finding the restriction in this case was necessary to serve the asserted compelling interest).
108. Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746,754 (7th Cir. 1972). See infra notes 117-
137 and accompanying text.
109. Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 905 (6th Cir. 1975).
110. Id. at 906; Sabel v. Stynchcombe, 746 F.2d 728, 731 n.7 (11th Cir. 1984). See infra
notes 138-156 and accompanying text.
111. Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (striking
down ordinance permitting government administrator to vary the fee for assembling or
parading to reflect the estimated cost of maintaining public order, and holding that the
ordinance unconstitutionally required the administrator to examine the content of the pro-
spective speaker's message-and to charge a higher fee for controversial viewpoints) (a
permit requirement "may not delegate overly broad licensing discretion to a government
official"); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (striking down a
parade permit scheme whose administration effectively vested unfettered discretion in li-
censing officials); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557 (1965) (observing that Supreme
Court precedents "make[ ] it clear that a State or municipality cannot 'require all who wish
to disseminate ideas to present them first to police authorities for their consideration and
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discretion in the licensing official "'has the potential for becoming a
means of suppressing a particular point of view.""' 2 If a regulation
leaves room for assessing the speaker's viewpoint in deciding whether
or not to grant a permit, "'the danger of censorship and abridgment of
our precious First Amendment freedoms is too great' to be
permitted.""' 3
These principles are so firmly grounded in precedent that a dis-
trict judge, confronted thirty years ago with the suppression of Viet-
nam War protesters, observed even then that:
It is established beyond need for an extended discussion that
municipalities cannot validly leave decisionmaking for allow-
ance of peaceful parades or demonstrations to the unbridled dis-
approval, with a discretion in the police to say some ideas may, while others may not, be
... disseminate[d] ... ."') (quoting Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939));
Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) (striking down ordinance that prohibited solic-
iting union membership without first obtaining a discretionary permit from the mayor or
city council); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (striking down an ordinance vesting
discretionary power in the city police commissioner to control in advance the right of citi-
zens to speak on religious matters in the streets of New York); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268 (1951) (reversing disorderly conduct conviction of Jehovah's Witnesses convicted
on the grounds that they used a public park for Bible talks without first obtaining a permit
from city officials even though there existed no statute or ordinance imposing a permit
requirement); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (striking down an ordinance
prohibiting the distribution of circulars, pamphlets, or literature of any kind without per-
mission from the city manager because ordinance contained no restrictions or limitations
on the city manager's discretion); Central Fla. Nuclear Freeze Campaign v. Walsh, 774 F.2d
1515 (11th Cir. 1985) (striking down ordinance requiring persons wishing to demonstrate in
city streets and parks to prepay amount of costs for additional police protection deter-
mined by discretion of police chief); Rubin v. City of Santa Monica, 823 F. Supp. 709 (C.D.
Cal. 1993) (permit scheme governing demonstrations in public parks struck down because
it vested undue discretion in the licensing official); id at 711 n.3 (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v.
City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225-26 (1990) as identifying "two evils" in speech licensing
schemes "that will not be tolerated:" vesting "unbridled discretion" in the licensing author-
ity, and "fail[ing] to place limits on the time within which the decisionmaker must issue the
license."); Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (enjoining city
officials from prohibiting a parade intended to protest U.S. military intervention in
Vietnam).
112. Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 130 (quoting Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981)).
113. Id. at 131 (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553
(1975)). Accordingly, "[a] permit scheme is constitutional as a reasonable time, place, and
manner restriction [only] if it is content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government[ ] interest, and leaves open ample alternatives for communication." Gay &
Lesbian Services Network, Inc. v. Bishop, 832 F. Supp. 270, 275 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (citing
Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 130). "The burden of proof on these [ ] factors falls squarely on the
government." Id. (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288,293
n.5 (1984)). "If it is determined that the permit scheme is not content neutral, then it must
be enjoined unless the [state] can show that it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government interest." Id. (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992)).
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cretion or mere opinion of a local official. The lodging of any
such broad discretion in a public official would permit such offi-
cial to say which expressions of view... will be permitted... a
power fraught with possibilities for selective administration that
would in effect deprive some groups of the equal protection of
the laws.114
Accordingly, a permit scheme will survive constitutional scrutiny only
if it employs content neutral criteria. 115  Without such standards,
"post hoc rationalizations by the licensing official and the use of shift-
ing or illegitimate criteria are far too easy, making it difficult for
courts to determine in any particular case whether the licensor is per-
mitting favorable, and suppressing unfavorable, expression." 1 1
6
b. Limiting the Denial of Permits Based on the Anticipation of
Violence
So committed is our jurisprudence to protecting the expression of
minority opinions that it forbids licensing authorities from considering
either the controversial nature of a speaker's viewpoint 17 or its poten-
tial for inspiring a hostile response." 8 Once again, these principles
were regarded thirty years ago as settled law:
114. Hurwitt, 247 F. Supp. at 1000-01.
115. Gay & Lesbian Services Network, 832 F. Supp; at 275 (striking down, as a content-
based restriction on speech, a parade permit scheme affording free police services for five
mainstream parades, including the Easter and St. Patrick's Day parades, but requiring all
other parade organizers to hire a specified quantity of off-duty police officers to furnish
traffic and crowd control).
116. New Alliance Party v. Dinkins, 743 F. Supp. 1055, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (demon-
strations at the mayor's mansion in New York City) (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750,758 (1989)). Accord Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
268, 271 (1951) (holding that statutes and ordinances requiring permits as a prerequisite for
speech in public places must be invalidated "in the absence of narrowly drawn, reasonable,
and definite standards for the officials to follow").
117. Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 134 (under the ordinance struck down, assessment of fees de-
pended on the amount of hostility a speaker was likely to incur); Christian Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 972 F.2d 365, 372 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (affirming grant of injunction requiring issuance of parade permit to KKK) ("the
government may not impose even a place restriction on a speaker's use of a public forum
on the basis of what the speaker will say" unless it is necessary to advance a compelling
state interest); Central Fla. Nuclear Freeze Campaign v. Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515, 1524 (11th
Cir. 1985) ("Such an inquiry into the content of the speakers' views in determining how
much police protection is needed and as a consequence, how much the speakers would
have to pay to voice their views, constitutes an impermissible price tag on the exercise of
free speech based on the content of the speech."); Hurwitt, 247 F. Supp. at 1001 (speech
may not be prohibited "merely because the views expressed may be so unpopular at the
time as to stir the public to anger").
118. Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 134 ("Listeners' reaction to speech is not a content neutral
basis for regulation. Speech cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can be pun-
ished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob.") (citations omitted); Cen-
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It is . . well established that peaceful, orderly expressions of
views-through marches, demonstrations, or otherwise-cannot
be prohibited, or otherwise interfered with, merely because the
views expressed may be so unpopular at the time as to stir the
public to anger, invite dispute, and thus create, or appear... to
create, unrest or even disturbance. This is so because under
such a doctrine, unpopular political groups might be rendered
virtually inarticulate.'
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed these principles in For-
syth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement,120 where it struck down
a licensing scheme that permitted the administrator to vary the fee for
assembling or parading to reflect the estimated cost of maintaining
public order.' The Court observed that under this ordinance, "[t]he
fee assessed will depend on the administrator's measure of the
amount of hostility likely to be created by the speech based on its
content. Those wishing to express views unpopular with bottle-throw-
tral Ela. Nuclear Freeze Campaign, 774 F.2d at 1525 (holding that city cannot fix costs for a
demonstration based on the potential for a hostile reaction: "Otherwise, the result would
operate to charge more for speech which is unpopular or controversial, in the mind of a
public official."); Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746,754-55 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding
that Nazis were entitled to injunctive relief after city officials denied their application for
permit to hold demonstration in public park) ("As to the possibility of there being hostile
audience members causing violence, the law is quite clear that such considerations are
impermissible in determining whether to grant permits.... [I]t is impermissible even to
consider the threat of a hostile audience when ruling on a permit application or a request
for injunction against a demonstration.") (citations omitted); Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
Movement, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 419 F. Supp. 667, 674-75 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (ruling that
city official wrongfully denied parade permit to civil rights marchers) (stating that the pos-
sible presence of a hostile and violent audience is an impermissible consideration in grant-
ing an injunction or withholding a permit); Hurwitt, 247 F. Supp. at 1001 (potential that
speaker's viewpoint may "stir the public to anger, invite dispute, and thus create, or appear
... to create, unrest or even disturbance" cannot be the basis for withholding a permit);
Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 109 (M.D. Ala. 1965) (granting civil rights activists
injunctive relief ordering the State of Alabama to permit, and not to interfere with, plain-
tiffs' plans to march from Selma to Montgomery) ("The [State's] contention that there is
some hostility to this march will not justify its denial. Nor will the threat of violence consti-
tute an excuse for its denial.") (citations omitted); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist
Party of Am., 366 N.E.2d 347, 353 (Il. App. Ct. 1977) (declining to grant injunction sought
by the Village of Skokie to prohibit Nazi demonstration) (holding that the possible pres-
ence of a hostile and violent audience is an impermissible consideration in granting an
injunction or withholding a permit). Accord Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914
F.2d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming that 75-yard security zone established around
viewing stand and vessels in naval parade violated First Amendment rights of demonstra-
tors who, by sailing past the onlooking dignitaries, hoped to present an anti-war message)
("[T]he government... is not free to foreclose expressive activity in public areas on mere
speculation about danger.") (citation omitted).
119. Hurwitt, 247 F. Supp. at 1001.
120. 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
121. Id.
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ers, for example, may have to pay more for their permit."'12 In strik-
ing down the ordinance, the Court concluded: "Speech cannot be
financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned,
simply because it might offend a hostile mob."'"
Forsyth represents the continued vitality of a long line of cases-
stretching back through the anti-war and civil rights movements-in
which unpopular ideas have been guaranteed access to the market-
place of ideas. 24 These cases exemplify a commitment to open de-
bate that is all the more emphatic when one examines their underlying
facts. In virtually all of these cases, the would-be demonstrators were
facing a threat of violence that was more than merely hypothetical.
In Forsyth itself, the ordinance had been enacted "'[a]s a direct
result"' 12 of two violent demonstrations in which civil rights activists,
protesting racial discrimination in a rural Georgia county, were con-
fronted by hostile residents. The first march was brought to a prema-
ture halt when 400 Klan members, shouting racial slurs, began
throwing rocks and beer bottles. 26 The second march featured 20,000
marchers, 1000 counter-demonstrators, and 3000 law enforcement of-
ficers. 27 It was punctuated (though not halted) by rock-throwing, and
produced sixty arrests.128
Proposed marches by Klansmen and Nazis, which produced some
of the most famous cases in this line of precedent, likewise involved a
substantial threat of violence. In Village of Skokie v. National Socialist
Party of America, the court declined to enjoin a group of Nazis
from marching through an Illinois suburb populated by hundreds of
Holocaust survivors. 3 ° While refusing to prevent the march, the
court acknowledged that evidence had been presented showing that
"if the defendants ever appear in Skokie to demonstrate, there... is a
virtual certainty that thousands of irate Jewish citizens [will] physically
attack [them].'' In Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Invisible
Empire, Inc. v. District of Columbia,132 the KKK obtained an injunc-
tion permitting it to march in Washington, D.C., even though its previ-
122. Id at 134 (emphasis added).
123. IM at 134-35 (citations omitted).
124. See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
125. 505 U.S. at 126.
126. Id. at 125.
127. Id. at 125-26.
128. Id.
129. 366 N.E.2d 347 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
130. 1& at 349.
131. Id. at 353.
132. 972 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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ous rallies there had been cut short by violent crowds, 3 resulting in
brick-throwing, injuries, and multiple arrests.' 4
The anti-war and civil rights eras likewise contributed to this line
of cases-and likewise produced factual records bristling with vio-
lence. Vietnam protest marches were routinely subjected to guerilla
attacks by a variety of patriots, including the Hell's Angels, who
ripped banners and disabled loud-speakers. 35 Civil rights marchers
were greeted by flying "rocks, bricks, pieces of concrete, and explosive
devices."' 36 Through it all, courts have held firm to the notion that
access to public fora should not depend on the popularity of one's
views:
Thus, our laws bespeak what should be; for were it otherwise,
enjoyment of constitutional rights by the peaceable and law-
abiding would depend on the dictates of those willing to resort
to violence.137
c. The Presence of a Hostile Audience Does Not Authorize
Government Officials to Silence the Unpopular Speaker; Nor
May She Be Silenced on the Grounds that Her Message
is Offensive to Some or Even All of Her Listeners.
The reason for affording minority opinions such considerable pro-
tection was best explained by the Supreme Court in Terminiello v. City
of Chicago,38 in which Justice Douglas observed:
[I]t is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that
government remains responsive to the will of the people and
peaceful change is effected.... Accordingly a function of free
speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It
may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condi-
tion of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are,
or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and
challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and
have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of
an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, is
nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment....
There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive
view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas
133. Id. at 367.
134. Id. at 369.
135. Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
136. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 419 F. Supp. 667,
672 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
137. Id at 675.
138. 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (reversing breach-of-the-peace conviction of Christian Veterans
of America member who made racially inflammatory speech).
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either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or commu-
nity groups. 39
Based on this reasoning, it has long been established that the presence
of a hostile audience does not authorize government officials to si-
lence the unpopular speaker; nor may she be silenced on the grounds
that her message is offensive to some or even all of her listeners.140
139. Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
140. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,409 (1989) (overturning flag-burning conviction
and holding that "the government may [not] ban the expression of certain disagreeable
ideas on the unsupported presumption that their very disagreeableness will provoke vio-
lence," nor may it "assume that every expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot");
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (overturning flag-burning prosecution) ("It is
firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be pro-
hibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers."); Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965) ("[T]he 'compelling answer.., is that constitutional
rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to their assertion or exercise."') (quot-
ing Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963)); Terminello, 337 U.S. at 5 (As
construed by the trial court, the breach-of-the-peace ordinance "permitted conviction of
petitioner if his speech stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a
condition of unrest. A conviction resting on any of those grounds may not stand."); Glas-
son v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 899 (6th Cir. 1975) (protester brought civil rights
action against police officers who tore up a sign she was holding along a motorcade route
to be traveled by President Nixon) (imposing liability where the police officers destroyed
the protest sign because they deemed it "'detrimental' to the President or to the United
States.... and the only threat to public order ... was that from a hostile crowd who did not
approve of the sign but who, because of their number in relation to the number of police-
men .... presented no imminent threat of disorder ... ."); id. at 905 ("[A] hostile public
reaction does not cause the forfeiture of the constitutional protection afforded a speaker's
message.... ."); Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 83 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding
that bus terminal "operated by port authority is appropriate place for distributing leaflets,
carrying placards and conducting discussions with passers-by publicizing anti-war views to
general public and to servicemen," and that, since these activities were entitled to First
Amendment protection, plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief affording him access to
the terminal); id. at 92 ("The potential provocation caused by heated debate is not a valid
reason to preclude discussion."); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 366
N.E.2d 347, 355 (II1. App. Ct. 1977) ("But '[i]t is firmly settled that under our Constitution
the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are them-
selves offensive to some of their hearers,' or simply because bystanders object to peaceful
and orderly demonstrations.") (quoting Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970));
see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 611 (1971) (striking down ordinance that
prohibited sidewalk meetings by three or more people conducted "in a manner annoying
to persons passing by"); id. at 615 (holding that "public intolerance or animosity" cannot
be the basis for abridging the rights of free assembly and association); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,237 (1963) (holding that arrest, breach-of-the-peace conviction, and
punishment of civil rights protesters who merely marched peacefully on a sidewalk around
State House grounds to publicize their dissatisfaction with the prevailing atmosphere of
race discrimination violated their speech, assembly, and petition rights) (asserting that a
state cannot criminalize "the peaceful expression of unpopular views"); Americans United
for Separation of Church & State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1558 (6th Cir.
1992) (holding that "privately funded menorah display erected during Chanukah in tradi-
tional public forum did not violate [E]stablishment [C]lause" because it could not be seen
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A good example of this principle may be found in Glasson v. City
of Louisville,'4' where a solitary anti-Nixon protester, waiting along
the route of a Presidential motorcade amid a sea of Nixon support-
ers, 42 unfurled a protest sign that read: "Lead us to hate and kill pov-
erty, disease and ignorance, not each other."'43 The woman's sign
prompted "grumbling and mutter[ed] threats" among onlookers
across the street,144 and this hostility escalated until a nearby police
officer feared that "'the crowd ... [was] going to go over and get
her-maybe hurt her.""' 45
Obeying a general directive "to destroy all signs detrimental to
the President,"' 46
Officer Medley then approached appellant and, according to his
testimony, asked her "Would you please take this sign down
Lady; it's detrimental to the United States of America." When
Miss Glasson refused, and replied that she had a right to display
it, Medley took it from her and tore it up. The hecklers across
the street cheered and then immediately quieted down and be-
gan to disperse.' 47
Holding that the officer was liable for violating the protester's First
Amendment rights, the Glasson court observed that "hostile public
reaction does not cause the forfeiture of the constitutional protection
afforded a speaker's message,"'" and concluded:
To permit police officers to prohibit the expression of ideas
which they believe to be "detrimental" or "injurious" to the
President of the United States or to punish for incitement or
breach of the peace the peaceful communication of such
messages because other persons are provoked and seek to take
violent action against the speaker would subvert the First
Amendment, and would incorporate into that constitutional
by reasonable observer as a government endorsement of religion); id at 1553 ("[T]he
courts have recognized that we cannot allow the right of free speech to be restricted based
on the hostile reaction of those who disagree with it. 'Participants in an orderly demon-
stration in a public place are not chargeable with the danger, unprovoked except by the
fact of the constitutionally protected demonstration itself, that their critics might react with
disorder or violence."') (quoting Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133 n.1 (1966)). See
generally Note, Hostile-Audience Confrontations: Police Conduct and First Amendment
Rights, 75 MicH. L. REv. 180 (1976) (reviewing cases); Note, Protecting Demonstrators
from Hostile Audiences, 19 KAN. L. REV. 524 (1971) (reviewing cases).
141. 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1975).
142. Id. at 902.
143. Id. at 901.
144. Id. at 902.
145. Id
146. Id
147. Id.
148. Id. at 905.
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guarantee a "heckler's veto" which would empower an audience
to cut off the expression of a speaker with whom it disagreed.
The state may not rely on community hostility and threats of
violence to justify censorship.' 49
Glasson is significant because it offers substantial First Amend-
ment protection to a protester who was, in a very real sense, a solitary
counter-demonstrator disseminating her message at a unique forum in
the very midst of her opponents.
d. The State has an Affirmative Duty to Protect the Unpopular
Speaker and Therefore Must Act Within Reason to Facilitate
Free Expression Even Though It Engenders a Risk of
Public Disorder.
The government is not only barred from silencing a speaker con-
fronted by a hostile audience,150 but it often has an affirmative duty to
protect that speaker.' 5 ' For example, the officer in Glasson destroyed
the protester's sign rather than protecting her right to display it. The
Glasson court observed:
149. Id. at 905-06 (footnote omitted).
150. See supra notes 138-149 and accompanying text.
151. See Sabel v. Stynchcombe, 746 F,2d 728, 729-30 (11th Cir. 1984) (overturning re-
fusal-to-disperse convictions of Revolutionary Communist Party demonstrators who, in the
course of a May Day rally, inspired a hostile reaction by almost 200 onlookers); Wolin v.
Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that group seeking to use
bus terminal as public forum for communication of anti-war views was "entitled to protec-
tion by [t]erminal police" against disturbances provoked by hostile audience); Downie v.
Powers, 193 F.2d 760, 762 (10th Cir. 1951) (reversing district court's dismissal of civil rights
action brought by Jehovah's Witnesses against police department for standing by and fail-
ing to protect them when a mob burst into the auditorium where they were gathered and,
using "'sticks, rocks, guns and other instruments of violene .... attacked [them] and broke
up the assembly"'); Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 1965)
("[S]uppression by public officials or police of the right of free speech and assembly cannot
be made an easy substitute for the performance of their duty to maintain order by taking
such steps as may be reasonably necessary and feasible to protect peaceable, orderly
speakers, marchers or demonstrators in the exercise of their rights against violent or disor-
derly retaliation or attack at the hands of those who may disagree and object."); cf Feiner
v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 317 (1951) (upholding disorderly conduct conviction of speaker
on public sidewalk whose "derogatory remarks concerning President Truman, the Ameri-
can Legion, the Mayor of Syracuse, and other local political officials" inspired a hostile
crowd reaction); id. at 325-27 (Black, J., dissenting) ("It is neither unusual nor unexpected
that some people at public street meetings mutter, mill about, push, shove, or disagree,
even violently, with the speaker. Indeed, it is rare where controversial topics are discussed
that an outdoor crowd does not do some or all of these things .... [The officers'] duty was
to protect petitioner's right to talk, even to the extent of arresting the man who threatened to
interfere.") (citation omitted) (emphasis added); id. at 331 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("It is
against that kind of threat that speakers need police protection. If they do not receive it
and instead the police throw their weight on the side of those who would break up the
meetings, the police become the new censors of speech.").
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A police officer has the duty not to ratify and effectuate a heck-
ler's veto nor may he join a moiling mob intent on suppressing
ideas. Instead, he must take reasonable action to protect from
violence persons exercising their constitutional rights. 152
It is not enough for police to remain neutral in a hostile audience situ-
ation. They have an affirmative duty to protect the speaker: "One
charged with the duty of keeping the peace cannot be an innocent
bystander where the constitutionally protected rights of persons are
being invaded. He must stand on the side of law and order or be
counted among the mob.' '153
The Eleventh Circuit has identified a variety of options that po-
lice may pursue in carrying out their duty to protect. In Sabel v.
Stynchcombe, 54 it overturned several refusal-to-disperse convictions
of Revolutionary Communist Party demonstrators who, in the course
of a May Day rally, inspired a hostile reaction by almost 200 onlook-
ers. The court observed:
If police believed, as they stated, that they were less concerned
with appellants' intrusions than with protecting them from an
increasingly threatening crowd, they enjoyed an even greater
range of choice. They could have taken steps to protect appel-
lants while allowing the demonstration to continue, such as sur-
rounding the speakers or arresting those spectators who
threatened violence. Or they could have taken [Revolutionary
Communist] Party members into temporary protective custody,
curtailing the demonstration but not subjecting appellants to
prosecution. 55
The court concluded that "the 'shouting,' 'shoving' and 'cursing' that
witnesses observed among the 200 onlookers "provided an insufficient
basis for governmental restriction of protected speech."' 56
These precedents show that, in balancing the right to free expres-
sion against concerns for public safety and civic order, our First
Amendment jurisprudence leans heavily in favor of speech-even
speech of the most provocative sort.
152. 518 F.2d at 906.
153. Downie, 193 F.2d at 764. Accord Wolin, 392 F.2d at 94; Kelly v. Page, 335 F.2d 114,
119 (5th Cir. 1964); Hurwitt, 247 F. Supp. at 1001.
154. 746 F.2d 728 (11th Cir. 1984).
155. Id. at 731 (citations omitted). See generally Note, Hostile-Audience Confronta-
tions: Police Conduct and First Amendment Rights, 75 MIcH. L. R.v. 180 (1976) (proposing
a standard for police conduct in the hostile audience situation); Note, Protecting Demon-
strators from Hostile Audiences, 19 KAN. L. REV. 524 (1971) (reviewing cases and sug-
gesting the optimum approach).
156. Sabel, 746 F.2d at 730 (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) and Gregory v.
City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1968)).
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2. Limitations on Government Power to Punish Seditious Speech
This profound commitment to free expression even at the ex-
pense of public disorder is best exemplified in the Supreme Court's
treatment of seditious speech. Throughout this century, government
officials have sought to punish such provocative sentiments as opposi-
tion to the United States involvement in World War I,157 calls for
"class struggle"'158 and "revolutionary mass action,"'15 9 Communist
Party membership, 160 waving a red flag,' 61 and burning the American
flag.' 62
In response to these prosecutions, the Supreme Court developed
a constitutional standard that, starting with the "clear and present
danger" test 63 and culminating in Brandenburg v. Ohio,'64 grew ever
more protective of speech. While originally permitting punishment
for mere opposition to government policies, 165 the Court subsequently
rejected criminal liability even for speech that had "'a dangerous ten-
dency' to start an insurrection.' 66 Finally, in Brandenburg, the Court
established an even more protective standard, permitting punishment
only for incitement that is both intended and likely to produce "immi-
nent lawless action.' '1 67
Thus, the Court has ruled that Julian Bond could not be denied a
seat in the Georgia House of Representatives for expressing "sympa-
thy with, and support [for] the men in this country who are unwilling
to respond to the military draft"; 68 that an anti-war activist could not
be prosecuted for saying "'[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first
man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.';169 and that a campus anti-
war protester who joined other demonstrators in blocking a street
157. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919).
158. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
159. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
160. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927).
161. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
162. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
163. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
164. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
165. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
166. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 262 (1937).
167. 395 U.S. at 447.
168. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
169. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969).
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could not be punished for declaring, after police dispersed the crowd,
"'We'll take the fucking street later."' 170
Overturning a flag-burning prosecution in Texas v. Johnson, 7'
the Court rejected the state's assertion that a particular expression
should be punishable if, due to its inherently offensive nature, an audi-
ence will likely be provoked by it to disturb the peace.' 72 The Court
replied that "'if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that con-
sequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection,"" 73 and
concluded:
[T]he government may [not] ban the expression of certain disa-
greeable ideas on the unsupported presumption that their very
disagreeableness will provoke violence.
Thus, we have not permitted the government to assume
that every expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot, but
have instead required careful consideration of the actual circum-
stances surrounding such expression, asking whether [it] "is di-
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action."' 74
Overturning an earlier flag-burning conviction in Street v. New
York,'"5 the Court stressed that "'freedom to be intellectually... di-
verse or even contrary"' must be upheld regardless of any "'fear that
[such] freedom... will disintegrate the social organization." ' 176 The
Court relied on the rationale that "'[fjreedom to differ is not limited
to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of
freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that
touch the heart of the existing order. '" 77
B. Applying Existing Precedent to Government Restrictions on
Counter-Demonstration
Having sketched the pertinent lines of precedent, this Article
now applies them in the context of counter-demonstration. Though
the right to counter-demonstration has not yet been expressly recog-
nized by the courts, the basis for doing so already resides at the very
core of our First Amendment jurisprudence. First, the argument for
170. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 106-07 (1973).
171. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
172. Id. at 408.
173. Id. at 409 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
174. Id. (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
175. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
176. Id at 593 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641
(1943)).
177. Id. (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
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banning counter-demonstration is based upon a "spontaneous com-
bustion" thesis that has long been rejected by the courts. Second,
under existing precedent, the reasons for tolerating speech that engen-
ders the risk of public disorder apply with equal force to demonstra-
tors and counter-demonstrators alike. Ultimately, the same lines of
precedent that support the right to address a manifestly hostile audi-
ence,178 to demonstrate despite the concomitant risk of civil unrest, 17 9
and to advocate revolution in the abstract 80 likewise support the right
to engage in counter-demonstration.
1. The Argument for Banning Counter-Demonstration is Based upon a
"Spontaneous Combustion" Thesis that Has Already Been
Rejected Under Existing Precedent.
Those who would ban counter-demonstration cite the need for
averting a particular sort of danger-a danger common to all public
protest. The fear is that counter-demonstrators will incite opposing
protesters or onlookers to inevitable lawlessness. This "spontaneous
combustion" thesis supported the trial court's ban on counter-demon-
stration in Seven Hills,'8' and it motivated New York police to deny
both conservative and gay Catholics access to the steps of St. Patrick's
Cathedral during the Gay Pride Parade in Olivieri.182 The spontane-
ous combustion thesis is philosophically identical to the concerns for
inevitable lawlessness that prompted official restrictions on provoca-
tive expression in Forsyth,'83 Johnson,'" Brandenburg,'85 Termi-
niello,186 Sabel,'s7 and Glasson.188 In each of those cases, authorities
sought to restrict expression thought certain to produce explosive re-
sults. In each of those cases, the courts invalidated the restrictions as
antithetical to the First Amendment. Further, each of those decisions
was motivated by a judicial understanding of incitement-and its rela-
tion to free expression-that applies with equal force to counter-dem-
178. See supra notes 138-149 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 117-137 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 157-177 and accompanying text.
181. City of Seven Hills v. Aryan Nations, No. 258726, C.P. Ct., Cuyahoga County,
Ohio (Dec. 15, 1993), affd, No. 66754, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 575 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 16,
1995). See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
182. Olivieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987). See
supra note 92 and accompanying text.
183. Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
184. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
185. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
186. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
187. Sabel v. Stynchcombe, 746 F.2d 728 (11th Cir. 1984).
188. Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1975).
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onstration, and provides a philosophically compelling reason to grant
counter-demonstration the same protection afforded other provoca-
tive speech.
The central premise of the spontaneous combustion thesis is the
belief that groups with diametrically opposed viewpoints cannot share
a forum without the substantial likelihood of violence. 18 9 Even if this
were true, however, it would provide no constitutionally sound reason
to distinguish counter-demonstration from other forms of provocative
expression already protected by the First Amendment. All forms of
provocative expression-the exhortation to revolution, the speech to a
manifestly hostile audience, or the act of counter-demonstration-
present a risk of public disorder, which risk in each case depends not
so much upon the lawlessness of the speaker, as upon the reaction of
the audience. 90
Attempts to limit counter-demonstration, or any other form of
provocative speech, seek to preserve public order by simple and direct
means: shielding a hostile or impressionable audience from the provo-
cation that might otherwise ignite it. Such efforts withhold informa-
tion from a public charged with self-governance, 191 and prohibit
individuals from engaging in expressive conduct due to potential mis-
conduct by others.' 92 Restrictions such as these run directly counter
to the philosophical justifications at the heart of First Amendment
jurisprudence.
189. Authorities in the Seven Hills case predicted violent confrontations between dem-
onstrators and counter-demonstrators despite the direct trial testimony of both sets of pu-
tative demonstrators that they remained committed to non-violent protest. See supra notes
78-85 and accompanying text.
190. This position was voiced with respect to seditious speech early in the history of
modem First Amendment jurisprudence by Justice Holmes, who warned (before his con-
version to a clear and present danger standard of review) that in certain volatile quarters
even "a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame." Frohwerk v. United States, 249
U.S. 204,209 (1919). That audience reaction is a sine qua non of provocative speech is self-
evident; without the conscious choice of auditors to react violently, the expression cannot,
as a matter of mere definition, be provocative. Thus:
[I]t is clear that expression which leads an opponent to violent counter-action
nevertheless remains 'expression,' and that the ensuing conduct of the opponent
is separable 'action.' This rule applies even where the speaker is deliberately pro-
vocative. The provocative nature of the communication does not make it any the
less 'expression.' Indeed, the whole theory of free expression contemplates that
expression will be provocative and arouse hostility in many circumstances. The
audience, just as the speaker, has the obligation to maintain physical restraint.
THOMAS I. EMERsoN, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 337 (1970).
191. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
192. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 419 F. Supp. 667,
675 (N.D. 11. 1976) (asserting that the enjoyment of constitutional rights should not de-
pend "on the dictates of those willing to resort to violence").
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2. Under Existing Precedent, the Reasons for Tolerating Speech that
Engenders the Risk of Public Disorder Apply with Equal
Force to Demonstrators and Counter-Demonstrators
Alike.
The two lines of precedent that have been examined-limiting
the government's power to restrict potentially volatile demonstra-
tions193 and to punish seditious speech' 94 -display a profound com-
mitment to free expression even at the expense of public disorder.
The reasons for that commitment apply with equal force to demon-
strators and counter-demonstrators alike. Moreover, there is no prin-
cipled basis for reading these precedents as conferring greater
protection for demonstrators than for counter-demonstrators.
The primary reason for our tolerance of provocative speech (and
its concomitant risk of public disorder) is that robust debate on public
issues is essential to the vitality of our democracy. "[S]peech concern-
ing public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government."' 9 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized "a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."' 96
Citizens often make choices on matters of public policy based on
their assessment of competing viewpoints. This notion of a market-
place of ideas-in which viewpoints vie for acceptance in the market
of public opinion' 97 -rests at the very heart of our First Amendment
jurisprudence.
Since truth is derived from the clash of competing viewpoints, "a
function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are,
or even stirs people to anger."'' 98
Our commitment to the marketplace of ideas requires that it be
held open to all viewpoints, even those "that we loathe and believe to
be fraught with death."'199 As Thomas Jefferson observed, "[T]he
public judgment will correct false reasonings and opinions, on a full
193. See supra notes 103-156 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 157-177 and accompanying text.
195. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
196. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
197. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[tihe
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.").
198. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
199. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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hearing of all parties."200 Accordingly, "the fitting remedy for evil
counsels is good ones."2 10 If the government were free to banish con-
troversial sentiments from the marketplace of ideas, the quality of our
public decisionmaking would be impaired,202 and we would drift inevi-
tably toward a stifling orthodoxy.203 Thus, even when the clash of
viewpoints seems likely to produce a disturbance, the government
cannot suppress debate:
[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of distur-
bance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expres-
sion. Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause
trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion may inspire
fear. Any word spoken ... that deviates from the views of an-
other person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But
our Constitution says we must take this risk; and our history
says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of open-
ness-that is the basis of our national strength and of the inde-
pendence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this
relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.2°4
The reasons for protecting robust debate even at the expense of
public order apply with equal force to demonstrators and counter-
demonstrators alike. Indeed, there is no principled basis for distin-
guishing between them. Counter-demonstration is no less a form of
speech, no less a form of public advocacy, and no less a contribution
to the marketplace of ideas. In fact, by promoting the close juxtaposi-
tion of competing viewpoints, counter-demonstration is especially
well-suited to the goals of the First Amendment. It advances public
discourse on a given subject by presenting citizens with a stark choice
between rival perspectives.
200. PADOVER, supra note 38.
201. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
202. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GovERN-
mENT 26 (1948) ("Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are
denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is
relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for
the general good. It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community against
which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed.").
203. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4-5 (permitting censorship or punishment of provocative
speech "would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant
political or community groups"). Accord West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.").
204. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sel. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969) (citation
omitted).
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Counter-demonstration is no less deserving of First Amendment
protection merely because it entails the sharing of a forum by rival
factions. Existing precedent already affords substantial protection for
speakers who wish to venture into hostile territory. 0 5 If Nazis have
the right to march through Skokie,0 6 and if police must protect a soli-
tary protester who unfurls an anti-Nixon sign amid a sea of antago-
nists, 20 7 then counter-demonstrators cannot be barred from a forum
merely because their views differ from the protesters already en-
sconced there.
When government officials, animated by the spontaneous com-
bustion thesis, ban the presence of counter-demonstrators at a partic-
ular forum, they are effectively permitting speech on a given subject
only one viewpoint at a time. In recognizing that public meetings will
necessarily involve the heated expression of opposing viewpoints, the
California Supreme Court observed:
The First Amendment contemplates a debate of important pub-
lic issues; its protection can hardly be narrowed to the meeting
at which the audience must passively listen to a single point of
view. The First Amendment does not merely insure a market-
place of ideas in which there is but one seller.20 8
Because the First Amendment actively encourages the clash of
competing viewpoints;2° because it limits would-be censors from con-
sidering either the controversial nature of a speaker's viewpoint 0 or
its potential for inspiring a hostile response;211 and because it protects
"uninhibited,"12 2  "provocative ' ' 11 debate, even at the expense of
"public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest,' 2 14 the First Amend-
ment likewise permits counter-demonstrators to deliver their message
in the same forum, and at the same time, as those whose message they
oppose.
205. See supra notes 117-156 and accompanying text.
206. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 366 N.E.2d 347,354 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1977) (declining to grant injunction sought by the Village of Skokie to prohibit Nazi
demonstration). Accord Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding
that Nazi group was entitled to injunctive relief compelling city officials to issue a permit to
hold demonstration in public park).
207. Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 906 (6th Cir. 1975).
208. In re Kay, 464 P.2d 142, 147 (Cal. 1970) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
209. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) ("[A] function of free speech
under our system is to invite dispute.").
210. Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire, Inc. v. District of Colum-
bia, 972 F.2d 365, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
211. Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746, 754 (7th Cir. 1972).
212. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
213. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4.
214. Id.
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C. Abstract Philosophical Justifications for Protecting Provocative
Speech-Developed Outside the Judicial Context-Likewise
Support a Right to Counter-Demonstration.
The political and jurisprudential decision to place certain types of
activity within the protective ambit of the Constitution is a decision to
place that activity beyond the reach of ordinary politics. Such a deci-
sion is profoundly anti-democratic for it places beyond popular con-
trol the ability to limit, through the agency of law, the conduct so
shielded.215 Broadly speaking, there are two sorts of arguments ad-
vanced in favor of protecting free expression against majoritarian con-
trol: consequentialist and non-consequentialist.216
In the consequentialist view, the value of free expression is not
intrinsic to the act of expression itself, but rather is dependent upon
the social good we believe free expression can achieve in the context
of democratic self-government.21 7 Free expression so conceived bor-
rows its moral authority from democratic liberty.218 The value of free
speech in this context is its consequence of facilitating another basic
right which can be derived from first principles as a basic moral claim
against the state.21 9
By contrast, the non-consequentialist view requires no link to an-
other, higher principle in order to justify free expression. In this view,
free expression is an end in itself, an independent telos toward which
enlightened government should work for its own sake.2 0 This argu-
ment places free expression much closer to the core of human values
than the consequentialist view. Rather than viewing expression as a
means toward human happiness through the agency of democratic lib-
215. John Hart Ely wrote:
The Court may be purseless and swordless, but its ability importantly to influence
the way the nation functions has proved great, and seems to be growing all the
time. It may be true that the Court cannot permanently thwart the will of a solid
majority, but it can certainly delay its implementation for decades ... and to the
people affected, that's likely to be forever.
JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dismusr 45 (1980). To decide that a course of conduct is
beyond ordinary majoritarian control is to ascribe to the conduct in question a value
deemed so basic as to be inseparable from freedom itself. The claim inherent in proclaim-
ing a right fundamental is that the right itself represents an individual claim of autonomy
against the state.
216. Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & Pun. AF. 204,
205 (1972).
217. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 6-7, 47-48
(1982).
218. ld.
219. Id
220. Id. at 48-49.
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erty, the non-consequentialist position views expression as a source of
human happiness, and a basic human right in and of itself.
Both the consequentialist and the non-consequentialist views of
free expression provide a variety of reasons for protecting provocative
speech that poses a threat to public order. More precisely, both views
of free expression impose distinct limitations upon the legitimacy of
restrictions on free expression.221
Under consequentialist principles, restrictions on free expression
should only be permissible if the challenged expression fails to ad-
vance the goals invoked to justify free expression generally,222 or if the
social cost of achieving those goals is prohibitively high. Under non-
consequentialist principles, as advanced by Thomas Scanlon, limita-
tions on expression are only legitimate if they do not offend the funda-
mental autonomy of citizens who are content to submit to the
legitimate authority of the state.2' Scanlon's thesis, discussed in
greater detail below,224 presents a compelling argument that no re-
strictions on provocative speech are tolerable that seek to avoid the
risk of civil disorder inherent in incitement. A brief review of both
consequentialist and non-consequentialist justifications for protecting
free expression reveals no principled reason why the First Amend-
ment should protect the right to address a hostile audience or advo-
cate lawlessness in the abstract, and not also protect counter-
demonstration.
221. See Scanlon, supra note 216, at 208-09:
Now it is not in general sufficient justification for a legal restriction on a certain
class of acts to show that certain harms will be prevented if this restriction is
enforced. It might happen that the costs of enforcing the restriction outweigh the
benefits to be gained, or that the enforcement of the restriction infringes some
right either directly (e.g., a right to the unimpeded performance of exactly those
acts to which the restriction applies) or indirectly (e.g., a right which under pre-
vailing circumstances can be secured by many only through acts to which the re-
striction applies). Alternatively, it may be that while certain harms could be
prevented by placing legal restrictions on a class of acts, those to whom the re-
striction would apply are not responsible for those harms and hence cannot be
restricted in order to prevent them.
222. I. at 205.
223. Id at 216-17. Scanlon distinguishes his own limited notion of individual autonomy
with respect to the state from the more comprehensive view of Kant. In Scanlon's view, a
citizen can remain autonomous while still submitting his judgment to the collective judg-
ment of the state if a rational and autonomous actor would submit without compromising
his independence of judgment. Id at 217-18.
224. See infra notes 240-243 and accompanying text.
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1. Consequentialist Principles
Foremost among the consequentialist justifications for free ex-
pression is the idea that political truth can best be found in the open
clash of competing ideas-that the airing of rival viewpoints is essen-
tial to democratic self-governance. 22s Ever since Justice Holmes's dis-
sent in Abrams v. United States,22 6 "[t]he marketplace of ideas theory
[has] consistently dominate[d] the Supreme Court's discussion of free-
dom of speech. Marketplace imagery ('competition of ideas,' the
value of 'robust debate') pervades judicial opinions and provides justi-
fications for the court's [F]irst [A]mendment 'tests.' '227
Of course, the simultaneous presence of competing ideas in a
general intellectual marketplace that makes them equally accessible to
all is, in itself, insufficient to promote the search for truth. Essential to
the dynamic of the marketplace is the open confrontation of opposing
viewpoints.2 s Thus:
Freedom of speech has become a central concern of western so-
ciety because of the discovery among the Greeks that dialectic,
as demonstrated in the Socratic dialogues, is a principal method
of obtaining truth, and particularly of obtaining political and
moral truth.... The method of dialectic is to confront ideas with
225. See supra notes 195-204 and accompanying text. The notion that free expression is
basic to the process of democratic self-government is strongly associated with the work of
Alexander Meiklejohn. In a series of lectures delivered at Harvard in 1948, Meiklejohn
justified freedom of expression not only as a necessary precondition for self-government,
but as an unavoidable consequence of the compact of self-rule among political equals.
MEnuCEjoHN, supra note 202. For Meiklejohn, the democratic virtues of free expression
exist at several levels. Not least among these virtues is the role free expression plays in
helping to form citizens capable of, and accustomed to, the sort of reasoning needed to
govern themselves-a view first expressed by Plato in The Apology. Id. at 16-19. In
Meiklejohn's view, free expression is not a right based in natural law, but a course of
conduct growing naturally out of a compact recognizing universal suffrage. Ii at 26-27.
Free expression builds the mental capacity for self-government and fosters the intellectual
climate in which the people can manifest their sovereignty through self-government. LEE
C. BOLLINGER, TnE ToLE Nr SocIETY 49-50 (1986). More basically, free expression
permits the working of self-government by ensuring the unimpeded flow of information,
allowing the interchange of ideas necessary to permit informed choices. See SCHAUER,
supra note 217, at 38-39. Since any limitation on the information available to the people
would necessarily curtail their options, and consequently limit their sovereignty, govern-
ment, as the servant of the sovereign people, has no right to filter the information by which
its popular masters make law and decide policy. Id.
226. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
227. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 7 (1989).
228. Thomas R. Neiben, Free Speech, Persuasion and the Democratic Process, in PER.
sPECrVEs OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH 235-37 (Thomas L. Tedford, John J. Makay & David L.
Jamison eds., 1987).
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opposing ideas in order that the pro and con of the dispute will
lead to true ideas .... 229
Counter-demonstration fosters precisely this sort of dialectic, by juxta-
posing groups with deeply held, divergent viewpoints, and forcing
demonstrators, counter-demonstrators, and those watching them to at
least acknowledge the existence of-if not contemplate the opinions
of-a committed opposition. By confronting protesters with direct
opposition, counter-demonstrators transform a monologue into a dia-
logue conducted before an audience who as a result may begin to con-
sider in rational terms the arguments presented by each side.
He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that.
His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to
refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on
the opposite side, if he does not so much as know what they are,
he has no ground for preferring either opinion.23 °
John Stewart Mill argued that mere awareness of opposing viewpoints
was inadequate to the task of stimulating critical thought. For dia-
logue to be most effective in helping the listener perfect his beliefs:
He must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe
them, who defend them in earnest and do their very utmost for
them. He must know them in their most plausible and persua-
sive form; he must feel the whole force of the difficulty which
the true view of the subject has to encounter and dispose of, else
he will never really possess himself of the portion of truth which
meets and removes that difficulty.231
The opportunity to perceive beliefs so strongly held is the great dialec-
tic benefit of public protest. Thomas Emerson addressed the value of
public protest generally by noting that for both the protester and the
public, demonstration affords an opportunity to make manifest the
abstract:
The various modes of public assembly and petition play a vital
role in the modem system of free expression.... IT]hey are of
special and crucial significance for radical, unpopular or under-
privileged individuals and groups.
[P]ublic assemblies possess important advantages for effective
expression that do not inhere in other forms of communication.
They permit face-to-face contact between the speaker and his
audience, thereby increasing the flexibility of the interchange
229. Id. (quoting Walter Lippman, The Public Philosophy-The Indispensable Opposi-
tion, THE ATL wrc, August 1939, at 189).
230. JOHN S. MILL, ON LBERTY 35 (Hackett Publishing Co. 1978) (1859).
231. Id.
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and enhancing the power of the communication. For the partici-
pants they evoke feelings of solidarity and mutual support. For
the audience they evidence the intensity and dedication with
which the views expressed are held. 32
The same arguments apply with equal (if not greater) force to
counter-demonstration, which presents participants with a particularly
salient forum for enhancing the presentation of their message,2 3 3 bear-
ing witness to the strength of their conviction,234 and engaging their
ideological opponents in a direct contest of opposing viewpoints.235 In
short, counter-demonstration is an apt example of the marketplace of
ideas turned from abstraction into reality, where the proponents of
opposing views are permitted to vie for public support while defend-
ing their position through their words, their conduct, and whatever
message about their integrity (and the integrity of their beliefs) can be
inferred therefrom.
The benefits of open confrontation and dialectic are surely every
bit as present in counter-demonstration as in other forms of provoca-
tive speech. Moreover, it is in no way evident that counter-demon-
stration presents a greater risk of public disorder than other forms of
provocative expression protected by the First Amendment.236
Even if a specific act of counter-demonstration did present a de-
monstrably greater risk to public safety than previously tolerated acts
of provocative expression, that would not justify prohibiting counter-
demonstration generally, any more than a greater threat of audience
violence would justify a general ban on speech before hostile crowds.
The obligation of authorities is often to defend the unpopular speaker
from his censorial adversaries237 and-as is amply demonstrated by
the Supreme's Court's holding in Forsyth County-that obligation is
not changed by the degree of opposition the speaker may face.
It may well be that a community would find it cheaper to silence
a speaker or prohibit a demonstration than to furnish police or
possible military protection. But the constitutional right cannot
232. EMERSON, supra note 190, at 286.
233. See supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
236. In fact, the hostile audience cases (see supra notes 117-156 and accompanying text)
present instances where the risk of public disorder was truly staggering, but was held not to
justify foreclosing free expression. In Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505
U.S. 123, 133-36 (1992), for example, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
would not permit local authorities to foreclose a protest march involving 20,000 marchers,
1000 counter-demonstrators, and 3000 law enforcement officers. See supra notes 125-128
and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 150-156 and accompanying text.
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be measured in financial terms. Many aspects of democracy, in-
cluding holding elections and granting due process in criminal
trials, are more costly than other modes of procedure. Yet this
has never been considered grounds for dispensing with the dem-
ocratic process.
[I]t would be an unusual situation if a determined showing of
official force could not maintain order. If violence occurred de-
spite such protection it would most probably be the result of
willingness on both sides to incur it. Under these conditions vio-
lence would probably take place anyway, whether or not it was
preceded by a public assembly.238
The essential "bargain" presented by counter-demonstration is
the same as presented by other forms of provocative speech. The
clash of conflicting ideas advances the search for political truth. The
cost of this dialectic is the risk of civil disorder. In every modem case
where courts have been confronted with this bargain, they have opted
to protect expression whenever practical. The result with respect to
counter-demonstration should be the same.
2. Non-Consequentialist Principles
Non-consequentialist limitations on the power of the state to reg-
ulate free expression compel a similar conclusion. The most basic of
these limitations-the rights of citizens to express dissent and con-
front the government with grievances-is deeply implicated by limits
on provocative speech. If the right to 'free expression is to remain in
any sense a right, then it cannot be subject to the whim of a speaker's
opposition, to be withheld every time an angry crowd murmurs dis-
sent. "To cut off expression when a hostile group creates a clear and
present danger of disorder is to entrust enjoyment of constitutional
rights to the opposition, and indeed to encourage violence and disor-
der in public assemblies. '239
Another significant non-consequentialist limitation on state regu-
lation of provocative expression is suggested by Scanlon, who ques-
tions the legitimacy of any regulation that would prohibit speech to
avoid incitement based on the acceptance of or reflection upon ideas
expressed by the speaker.
238. EMERSON, supra note 190, at 34041.
239. EMERSON, supra note 190, at 326 (criticizing shortcomings in the Brandenburg ar-
ticulation of the clear and present danger test).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
If I were to say to you, an adult in full possession of your facul-
ties, "What you ought to do is rob a bank," and you were subse-
quently to act on this advice, I could not be held legally
responsible for your act, nor could my act legitimately be made
a separate crime. This remains true if I supplement my advice
with a battery of arguments about why banks should be robbed
or even about why a certain bank in particular should be robbed
and why you in particular are entitled to rob it.24
The reason why advice, even the advice to commit a crime, should not
give rise to criminal sanction (even if heeded) is that the auditor's
reflection upon the wisdom of the advice, and not the advice itself, is
what motivates the auditor to act.
A person who acts on reasons he has acquired from another's
act of expression acts on what he has come to believe and has
judged to be a sufficient basis for action. The contribution to
the genesis of his action made by the act of expression is, so to
speak, superseded by the agent's own judgment. 4'
The intermediation of reason on the part of the auditor leads Scanlon
to conclude that any principled restriction of free expression that
takes seriously the autonomy of the individual would not justify limit-
ing expression "where the connection between the acts of expression
and the subsequent harmful acts consists merely in the fact that the
expression led the agents to believe (or increase their tendency to be-
lieve) these acts to be worth performing. ''242
Scanlon's principle encapsulates, as a general rule, the repeated
decisions of the Supreme Court that prohibit foreclosing expression
because the opinion expressed is likely to motivate the auditor to ac-
tion. This is true whether the opinion expressed is feared as provoca-
tive by its power to incite the willing, or its repugnance to those who
hear it.243
In either case, prohibition is illegitimate if it seeks to foreclose
speech because it has the power to change minds. To hold otherwise
and to assume (consistent with the spontaneous combustion thesis)
"that every expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot,"'244 is to
240. Scanlon, supra note 216, at 212.
241. Id.
242.. Id at 213.
243. In Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), for example, the Court explicitly held
that "'if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for
according it constitutional protection."' Id. at 409 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (emphasis added). Likewise, with respect to
incitement to violence, expression may be curtailed to preserve order only where lawless-
ness is both the imminent and intended result of the provocation. Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
244. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409.
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view listeners as automata, incapable of directing their own mis-
deeds.24 The Supreme Court has expressly rejected such a view with
respect to other forms of provocative speech, and the reasons for such
a rejection apply with equal force to counter-demonstration.
IV. Conclusion
Counter-demonstration is an increasingly visible phenomenon in
our society. Its appeal to the would-be protester, and its capacity to
advance public discourse on a given subject, stem from a variety of
factors. These include its emphasis on confronting one's rival in per-
son, its consequent tendency to juxtapose competing viewpoints, and
its recognition that one forum may be uniquely pertinent to a debate.
Only two cases have expressly addressed the question of First
Amendment protection for counter-demonstration: Seven Hills-46 and
Olivieri.247 Neither expressly recognizes that counter-demonstration
is a unique form of expression whose protection should be no more
subject to compromise than the right to protest generally.
A right to counter-demonstration may be derived from two lines
of well-established precedent-decisions limiting government power
to restrict potentially volatile demonstrations, and decisions limiting
government power to punish seditious speech. These precedents con-
stitute a complete repudiation of the very argument-a spontaneous
combustion thesis-that has been used to justify bans on counter-
demonstration. Moreover, these precedents articulate reasons for tol-
erating provocative speech-even speech that engenders the risk of
public disorder-that apply with equal force to demonstrators and
counter-demonstrators alike. Finally, the philosophical underpinnings
of the First Amendment likewise support a right to counter-
demonstration.
Restrictions on counter-demonstration-like those governing any
other form of protest-are valid only as a necessary expedient to pre-
245. Of course the only place where the law sanctions so cynical a view of audience
reaction is in the context of fighting words, which "single[ ] out specific members of [the]
audience" for insult or provocation. See EMERSON, supra note 190, at 338. The hallmark
of fighting words is that they are "likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and
thereby cause a breach of the peace." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574
(1942).
246. City of Seven Hills v. Aryan Nations, No. 258726, C.P. Ct., Cuyahoga County,
Ohio (Dec. 15, 1993), affd, No. 66754, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 575 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb.
16, 1995). See supra notes 63-87 and accompanying text.
247. Olivieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987). See
supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
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vent imminent lawless conduct.248 In exercising their First Amend-
ment freedoms, counter-demonstrators otherwise have a right to
deliver their message in the same forum, and at the same time, as
those whose message they oppose.
248. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969)).
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